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Foreword
One of the most critical technical decisions made during the conduct of Project Apollo was the method of flying to
the Moon, landing on the surface, and returning to Earth. Within NASA during this debate, several modes emerged.
The one eventually chosen was lunar-orbit rendezvous (LOR), a proposal to send the entire lunar spacecraft up in one
launch. It would head to the Moon, enter into orbit, and dispatch a small lander to the lunar surface. It was the
simplest of the various methods, both in terms of development and operational costs, but it was risky. Because
rendezvous would take place in lunar, instead of Earth, orbit, there was no room for error or the crew could not get
home. Moreover, some of the trickiest course corrections and maneuvers had to be done after the spacecraft had been
committed to a circumlunar flight.
Between the time of NASA's conceptualization of the lunar landing program and the decision in favor of LOR in
1962, a debate raged among the advocates of the various methods. John C. Houbolt, an engineer at the Langley
Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, was one of the most vocal of those supporting LOR and his campaign in 1961
and 1962 helped shape the deliberations in a fundamental way. The monograph that is printed here is an important
contribution to the study of NASA history in general, and to the process of accomplishing a large-scale technological
program (in this case, Apollo) in particular. In many ways, the lunar mode decision was an example of heterogeneous
engineering, a process that recognizes that technological issues are also simultaneously organizational, economic,
social, and political. Various interests often clash in the decision-making process as difficult calculations have to be
made and decisions taken. What perhaps should be suggested is that a complex web or system of ties among various
people, institutions, and interests brought forward the LOR mode of going to the Moon in the 1960s.
This is the fourth publication in a new series of special studies prepared by the NASA History Office. The
Monographs ha Aerospace History series is designed to provide a wide variety of investigations relative to the
history of aeronautics and space. These publications are intended to be tightly focused in terms of subject, relatively
short in length, and reproduced in an inexpensive format to allow timely and broad dissemination to researchers
in aerospace history. Suggestions for additional publications in the Monographs ha Aerospace History series
are welcome.
Roger D. Launius
Chief Historian
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
7 November 1995

There was a reluctance to believe that the
rendezvous maneuver was an easy thing. In fact, to
a layman, if you were to explain what you had to
do to perform a rendezvous in space, he would say
that sounds so difficult we'll never be able to do it
this century.
Clinton E. Brown, head, Langley Lunar Mission
Steering Group on Trajectories and Guidance
(from an interview with the author, 17 July 1989)
I'm not so sure we ever thought of rendezvous as
very complicated. It's an amazing thing. We thought
that if our guys could work out the orbital mechanics
and we gave the pilot the right controls and stuff,
then he'd land it and make the rendezvous. We
didn't think it was very complicated.
Arthur W. Vogeley, Langley Guidance
and Control Branch
(from an interview with the author, 17 July 1989)
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ENCHANTED RENDEZVOUS: JOHN C. HOUBOLT AND THE GENESIS
OF THE LUNAR-ORBIT RENDEZVOUS CONCEPT
Introduction
On Thursday morning, 25 May 1961, in a speech to a
joint session of Congress, President John E Kennedy
challenged Americans to rebound from their recent
second-place finishes in the space race. "First, I believe
that this nation should commit itself to achieving the
goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the
moon and returning him safely to earth. No single space
project.., will be more exciting, or more impressive...
or more important.., and none will be so difficult or
expensive." The dynamic 43-year-old president also told
the American people, "It will not be one man going to the
Moon, it will be an entire nation. For all of us must work
to put him there. TM
At first, no one at NASA's Langley Research Center in
Hampton, Virginia, could quite believe it. If President
Kennedy had in fact just dedicated the country to lunar
landing, he could not be serious about doing it in less
than nine years. It was just not possible. NASA had been
studying the feasibility of different lunar missions for
some time. But sending an astronaut--_ne that landed on
and returned from the surface of the Moon safely by the
end of the 1960s? NASA was not exactly sure how that
lunar mission could be accomplished at all, let alone
achieved in so little time.
Not even Robert R. Gilruth, the leader of the Space Task
Group (STG) located at Langley and the long-standing
site of spacecraft expertise in the young federal agency,
was prepared for the sensational announcement. When
he heard the news, he was in a NASA airplane some-
where over the Midwest on his way to a meeting in
President John E Kennedy addressing a joint session of Congress on
25 May 1961 to announce an accelerated lunar landing program.
Tulsa. He knew that Kennedy planned to say something
dramatic about the space program in his speech, and he
asked the pilot to patch it through live on the radio.
Looking out the window over the passing clouds, he
heard every word and was struck by the incredible goal.
The message stunned him. "An accelerated program,
yes," he wanted that. "A lunar landing, yes, in an orderly
fashion, with time to work through all the difficulties that
such an enterprise was bound to encounter," he wanted
that, too. "But not this," he thought to himself.-' This was
too much, too fast. Talk about overconfidence--the first
piloted Mercury flight by Alan Shepard had taken place
only three weeks ago, on 5 May; NASA had made this
one brief fifteen-minute suborbital flight--not even a
complete orbit yet--and the president announced that the
nation is going to the Moon and on a very ambitious
schedule. Suddenly, the STG really had more than it
could handle. It already was busy preparing for another
suborbital flight (Virgil I. "Gus" Grissom's, on 21 July
1961) and for the first orbital flight sometime early next
year (John Glenn's, on 20 February 1962). The group's
top talent was still "involved almost exclusively" prepar-
ing for the first American orbital flight, and Gilruth him-
self, before the president's announcement, "had spent
almost no time at all" on lunar studies, so demanding
were the activities of Project Mercury. 3
Only one word described Gilruth's feelings at that
moment: "aghast." Aghast at the audacity of the presi-
dent's goal: for American astronauts to fly a quarter of a
million miles, make a pinpoint landing on a familiar but
yet so strange heavenly body, blast off, and return home
safely after a voyage of several days through space--all
this by the end of the decade. Only one thought was more
daunting, and that was that he was one of the people who
would have to make it happen.
But only the project managers directly responsible for
making Mercury a success felt so burdened in 1961 by
the prospects of having to meet the lunar commitment.
Other planners and dreamers about space exploration
inside NASA, whose natural curiosity and professional
inclination led to speculation about the profiles of future
missions, were elated.
For example, inside the small Theoretical Mechanics
Division set up inside the old stability wind tunnel building
at NASA Langley, Clinton E. Brown and his mathemati-
cally oriented colleagues, having heard about Kennedy's
announcement, said, "Hooray, let's put on full speed ahead,
and do what we can,' In their minds, landing astronauts on
the Moon as quickly as possible was obviously the right
MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY
thing to do next if the United States was going to win the
"space race?' Moreover, Brown and his team--plus one
other key langley researcher, Dr. John C. Houbolt, a ren-
dezvous expert not part of Brown's group, who later
became the leading actor in the lunar-orbit rendezvous
drama--were confident that they had figured out the best
way to accomplish it some time ago.' To understand this
confidence, however, an understanding of earlier develop-
ments provides necessary context.
Brown's Lunar Exploration
Working Group
In Sputnik's wake in late 1957, a small circle of Langley
researchers had plunged into the dark and frigid depths
of space science. "We were aeronautical engineers"
remembers William H. Michael, Jr., a member of Clinton
E. Brown's Theoretical Mechanics Division who had just
returned to Langley after a two-year stint in the aircraft
industry. "We knew how to navigate in the air, but we
didn't know a thing about orbital mechanics, celestial
trajectories, or interplanetary travel, so we had to teach
ourselves the subjects?' In the Langley technical library,
where during the days of the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) the word "space"
was not even allowed, Michael could find only one book
that helped. It was An Introduction to Celestial
Mechanics but it had been published in 1914, before the
first pioneering rocketry had taken place under Robert H.
Goddard. Michael had never heard of its author, a British
professor of astrophysics named Forrest R. Moulton?
With this out-of-date text in hand, nevertheless, Michael
and a few associates taught themselves enough about the
equations of celestial mechanics to grow confident in
their computations. Before long, the novices had trans-
formed themselves into experts and were using their
slide rules and early electronic computers to figure out
ways to reach the Moon and to return.
This team did not know at the time how useful their cal-
culations would so quickly turn out to be. In anticipating
the trajectories for different lunar missions in the late
1950s, Brown, Michael, and their colleagues were
"leapfrogging" over what most people deemed "the log-
ical next step": an Earth-orbiting "space station." The
group also did not know that their mental gymnastics
would set the direction of the U.S. space program for the
next twenty years.
Even after Sputnik, most proponents of space travel still
believed--following the wisdom of Konstantin
Tsiolkovskiy, Hermann Oberth, Guido von Pirquet,
Wernher von Braun, and other space-minded visionar-
ies-that humankind's first step out into the universe
would be to some sort of space station in the Earth's
orbit. From this nearby outpost, which could also serve
as a research laboratory in which all sorts of unique
experiments and valuable industrial enterprises might be
conducted, human travelers could eventually venture out
in spaceships for trips to the Moon, the planets, and
beyond. Therefore, after establishing Project Mercury,
and putting an astronaut into space, most in NASA
believed that the development of a space Station was "the
next logical step." It was the perfect target project by
which NASA could focus its space-related studies as
well as its future plans?
But Clint Brown and his associates felt differently: the
politics of the space race were dictating the terms of the
American space program, not the inspired prophecies of
the earliest space pioneers. The Soviet Union had already
demonstrated that it had larger boosters than did the
United States, which meant that the Soviets had the capa-
bility of establishing a space station before Americans
could do so. Brown explained years later, "If we put all
our efforts into putting a space station around the word,
we'd probably find ourselves coming in second again?'
The "obvious answer" was that "you had to take a larger
bite and decide what can really give us leadership in the
space race." To him "that clearly seemed the possibility
of going to the Moon and landing there. ''7 In other words,
what Brown was arguing, in this feverish and confused
early stage of the spaceflight revolution, was that the
"obvious answer" should take precedence over the "next
logical step."
The conviction inside Brown's Theoretical Mechanics
Division in favor of lunar studies over space station
studies grew stronger in early 1959, when Langley's
Associate Director, Eugene Draley, agreed to form a
Langley working group to study the problems of lunar
exploration. Brown, the catalytic group leader, asked
for the participation of six of Langley's most thoughtful
analysts: David Adamson, Supersonic Aerodynamics
Division; Paul R. Hill, Pilotless Aircraft Research
Division; John C. Houbolt, Dynamic Loads Division;
Albert A. Schy, Stability Research Division; Samuel
Katzoff, Full-Scale Research Division; and Bill
Michael of Brown's Theoretical Mechanics Division.
Dr. Leonard Roberts, a talented young mathematician
from England, eventually joined the group. Brown
assembled them for the first time in late March 1959
and then periodically into 1960. Besides advising
Langley management on the establishment of
lunar-related research programs, Brown's people also
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organized a course in space mechanics for interested
center employees. For many involved, this course
offered their first real exposure to relativity theory. The
Brown study group even disseminated information
about the Moon by holding public seminars led by
experts from Langley and nearby universities?
Everything about this original lunar study group was done
quietly and without much fuss. In those early days of
NASA, when the management of research was still loose
and did not always require formal research authorizations
or approval from NASA headquarters in Washington, the
research center pretty much ran itself. Langley manage-
ment, from Director Henry Reid and Associate Director
Floyd Thompson on down, was oriented toward research
and encouraged its people to take some initiative. When
Brown expressed his desire to work more on lunar explo-
ration than on the space station, Draley simply told him,
"Fine, go ahead." Henceforth, he and his lunar working
group accentuated their efforts in studying the problems
associated with how America would someday reach the
Moon. They were doing what Langley researchers did best:
they were exploring an interesting new idea and seeing how
far they could go with it.
The researchers at Langley were not the only Americans
thinking seriously about lunar missions. There were offi-
cers in the Air Force, people in "think tanks," professors
at universities, and other engineers and scientists in and
around NASA all contemplating going to the Moon. In
February 1959, a month before the creation of Brown's
lunar exploration group at Langley, NASA headquarters
created a small Working Group on Lunar and Planetary
Surfaces Exploration. (This later evolved into the
Science Committee on Lunar Exploration.) Chaired by
Dr. Robert Jastrow, the head of NASA headquarters' new
Theoretical Division, the working group included such
leaders in planetology and lunar science as Harold C.
Urey, professor at large at the University of California at
San Diego, as well as a number of leading scientists from
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California,
and a few from Langley. In their meetings, Jastrow's
group looked into the chances for both a "rough" landing
on the Moon--wherein a probe would crash into the sur-
face and be destroyed but not until an on-board camera
sent back dozens of valuable pictures to the Earth--as
well as "soft" landings wherein a spacecraft would actu-
ally land intact on the Moon. Langley's William Michael
attended one of the first meetings of Jastrow's commit-
tee. Partly in reaction to what he had heard at this meet-
ing, Michael and others at Langley began developing
some ideas for photographic reconnaissance of the
Moon's surface from lunar orbit, as well as for lunar
impact studies? John Houbolt, of Langley's Dynamic
Loads Division, also participated in some of these meet-
ings to share his knowledge of the requirements for
spacecraft rendezvous.
Two months later, in April 1959, NASA headquarters
formed a Research Steering Committee on Manned
Space Flight. The purpose of this special committee--
which was chaired by former Langley engineer Harry J.
Goett, the first Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight
Center--was to analyze human-in-space problems, make
recommendations about the missions to follow Project
Mercury, and to explore the technological "stepping
stones" necessary to prepare for future missions. It
would then set forth the general outline of research pro-
grams to support those missions. _°
In its final report, which appeared at the end of 1959, the
Goett Committee (as it was known) called for a lunar
landing with astronauts as the appropriate long-term goal
of NASA's space program. But between the present
emphasis on Project Mercury and that goal, there needed
to be major interim programs designed to develop
advanced orbital capabilities and a manned space station.
Langley's representative on the Goett Committee,
Laurence K. Loftin, Jr., the technical assistant to Langley
Research Center Associate Director Floyd L. Thompson,
agreed with this thinking. However, two other members,
the STG's Max Faget and George M. Low, NASA's
Director of Spacecraft and Flight Missions in
Washington, did not. During meetings from May to
December 1959, they voiced the minority opinion: that
the Moon should be NASA's next objective after Mercury.
George Low, brought to NASA headquarters by Director
of Space Flight Programs Abe Silverstein from NASA's
Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, was particularly
vocal. Not only did Low want to go to the Moon, he want-
ed Americans to land on it, and as soon as possible. I'
Michael's Paper on a "Parking Orbit"
Meanwhile at Langley, members of Brown's lunar explo-
ration group were already studying ways for landing on
the Moon someday. They explored several options and
ideas, but in one of these studies, by Bill Michael, the
group examined the benefits of "parking" the
Earth-return propulsion portion of a spacecraft in orbit
around the Moon during a landing mission.
The spark for Michael's interest in what eventually was
called a "parking orbit," a spacecraft in a "waiting"
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orbit around the Moon or some other celestial body,
involved his own calculations to determine whether
there was any advantage in a lunar mission to some
additional "staging,' Staging was a proven and neces-
sary technological concept, first explained by Tsarist
Russia's space visionary Tsiolkovskiy in the late 1800s,
by which a self-propelled, staged-rocket vehicle
(Tsiolkovskiy called it a rocket "train") could ascend to
greater and greater heights as its different stages
expended their fuel and separated.
In a lunar landing mission, Michael speculated, one would
not want to fly a big rocket directly from the Earth to the
Moon, as Jules Veme's popular book and other science tic-
tion fantasies envisioned. The big rocket would result in too
much unnecessary weight being taken down to the surface.
It would be much wiser to take "an intermediate step" and
go into lunar orbit, where much of the total weight
remained behind_e structure of the interplanetary
spacecraft, its heavy fuel load for leaving lunar orbit and
heading home, and its massive heat shield necessary for a
safe reentry into the Earth's atmosphere. "It's very expen-
sive to accelerate any type of mass to high velocity"
Michael reasoned. "Any time you do not have to do that,
you save a lot of fuel and thus a lot of weight "'12
The upshot of his calculations, which he documented in
early 1960 in a never-to-be-published paper titled,
"Weight Advantages of Use of Parking Orbit for Lunar
Soft Landing Mission," was to identify one of the most
basic advantages of what eventually was known as the
concept of "lunar-orbit rendezvous." Michael had to
make several assumptions about what might entail a
lunar landing mission--the spacecraft's engines, the
structural weights, and so forth. But his results implied
that by going into orbit around the Moon rather than
going directly to the lunar surface, one could save an
impressive 50 percent or more of the total mission
weight. Figuring the numbers did not require any diffi-
cult or sophisticated calculations. 13 Nor did it require
any knowledge of the writings of Russian rocket theo-
retician Yuri Kondratyuk and British scientist and
Interplanetary Society member H.E. Ross, both of
whom had expressed the fundamentals of the
lunar-orbit rendezvous concept (Kondratyuk in 1916
and Ross in 1948)? 4Neither Michael nor anyone else at
Langley at this point, so they have always maintained,
had any knowledge of those precursors.
The Langley scientists also had not yet known anything
about competition from contemporaries. That did not
take long, however. Later the same morning that
Michael first presented his rough "parking orbit" calcu-
lations in Clint Brown's office, a team led by Thomas
E. Dolan from Vought Astronautics, a division of the
Chance-Vought Corporation in Dallas, gave a briefing
at Langley. This briefing concerned Vought's ongoing
company-funded, confidential study of different prob-
lems related to "Manned Lunar Landing and Return"
(acronym "MALLAR") and, specifically, its plans for a
manned spaceflight simulator and its possible applica-
tion for research under contract to NASA.
During the briefing, Dolan's team members mentioned
an idea for reaching the Moon. Although the Vought rep-
resentatives focused their analysis on the many benefits
of what they called a "modular spacecraft"--one in
which different parts, including a lunar landing module,
were designed for certain tasks--Brown and Michael
understood what was being advertised: the essentials of
the lunar-orbit rendezvous concept. '_lThey got up there
and they had the whole thing laid out," Brown remem-
bers. "They had scooped us" with their idea of "design-
ing a spacecraft so that you can throw away parts of it as
you go along." For the next several days, Michael walked
around "with his face hanging down to the floor."
Nevertheless, the chagrined Langley engineer wrote
a brief paper, confident that he had spawned his
idea simultaneously and independently of all others.
Furthermore, the word spread around Langley that
Dolan had developed the idea of using a detachable
lunar-landing module for the actual landing operation
after an earlier visit to Langley when engineers in the
Pilotless Aircraft Research Division, who were somehow
familiar with Michael's embryonic idea, had suggested
a parking orbit. This explanation, however, may simply
have been "sour grapes,' On the other hand, Dolan
had made several visits to Langley in late 1959 and
early 1960, and Michael remembered having already
mentioned his idea to a few people at the laboratory, "so
it shouldn't have been any surprise to anybody here at
Langley that such a possibility existed "'_5The truth about
this will probably never be known.
What is known is that Michael's paper, at least in retro-
spect, had some significant limitations. It was only two
pages long and presented little analysis. Its charts were
difficult to follow and interpret. There was no mention of
"Earth-escape weights," although an informed reader
could infer such numbers by a type of inverse reasoning.
Perhaps most importantly, the paper did not explicitly
mention either the need for a separate lunar lander or the
additional weight savings derived from using one and
then discarding it before the return trip home. In sum,
one would already have to have been familiar with the
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subject even to recognize, let alone fully fathom, what
was being implied.
Michael's paper had one last problem: it was never pub-
iished. Therefore, it was hardly a fully developed articula-
tion of a lunar landing mission using lunar-orbit
rendezvous. Nonetheless, Michael's unpublished paper on
the weight advantages of a parking orbit made a funda-
mentally important contribution: for NASA researchers
contemplating lunar missions, it zeroed in on the central
theme of rendezvous. As his paper concluded, the chief
problems in a lunar landing mission were the "complica-
tions involved in requiring a rendezvous with the compo-
nents left in the parking orbit? ''_
Although disappointed that Vought had already hit on the
idea of lunar-orbit rendezvous, the Langley researchers
were hardly demoralized. Staffers in and around Brown's
division quickly began making lunar and planetary mis-
sion feasibility studies of their own. John P. Gapcynski,
for example, considered "factors involved in the depar-
ture of a vehicle from a circular orbit about the Earth."
Wilbur L. Mayo calculated energy and mass require-
ments for missions to the Moon and even to Mars. Robert
H. Tolson studied the effects on lunar trajectories of such
geometrical constraints as the eccentricity of the Moon's
orbit and the oblate shape of the Earth; he also analyzed
the influence of the solar gravitational field. John D.
Bird, who worked across the hall from Michael, began
designing different "lunar bugs," "lunar schooners," and
other types of small excursion modules that could land
on the surface of the Moon after departing a "mother
ship." "Jaybird" (as Bird was called by his peers) became
an outspoken advocate of the lunar-orbit rendezvous con-
cept. When a skeptical visitor to Langley offered, with a
chuckle, that lunar-orbit rendezvous was "like putting a
guy in an airplane without a parachute and having him
make a midair transfer," Bird set that visitor straight.
"No," he corrected, "It's like having a big ship moored in
the harbor while a little rowboat leaves it, goes ashore,
and comes back again. '']7
The Rendezvous Committees
There was a growing feeling within NASA in late 1959
and early 1960 that a rendezvous in space was going to
be a vital maneuver no matter what the agency's mis-
sion after Project Mercury might be. If it were a space
station, travel vehicles would have to meet and dock
with that station and then leave it. Thus NASA had to
be able to bring two vehicles together in space. A lunar
mission, too, would require some sort of rendezvous
either in lunar orbit, as Michael's study suggested, or
around the Earth from an orbital base--perhaps the
space station itself---where a lunar-bound spacecraft
might be assembled or at least fueled. Even if neither
were done, there would still be communications and
military "reconnaissance" satellites to inspect and
repair, which would also require rendezvous maneu-
vers. Rendezvous had to be a central element of all
future flight endeavors--whatever they might be.
By the late summer of 1959, Langley's senior staff was
ready to proceed with detailed studies of how best to per-
form rendezvous maneuvers in space. Two rendezvous
study committees eventually came to life, both chaired
by Dr. John C. Houbolt, the assistant chief of Langley's
Dynamic Loads Division.
Houbolt (with a B.S. and M.S. in civil engineering from
the University of Illinois) was an aircraft structures
expert who began working at Langley in 1942. In con-
trast to most Langley researchers, he had some signifi-
cant foreign experience, having been an exchange
research scientist at the British Royal Aircraft
Establishment at Farnborough, England, in 1949. In
1958, he had only recently returned from a year's educa-
tion at the Swiss Federal Polytechnic Institute in Zurich,
where his dissertation on the heat-related aeroelastic
problems of aircraft structure in high-speed flight had
earned him a Ph.D. TM
After returning from his graduate work in Switzerland,
Houbolt and many other Langley researchers in the
post-Sputnik phase became increasingly curious about
spaceflight. Largely independent of the conversations
taking place within Brown's group, Houbolt was on his
own. He said years later, "I racked down and went
through the whole analysis of orbital mechanics so I
could understand it." From his own preliminary studies
of trajectories, he saw the vital importance of rendezvous
and began to recognize and evaluate the basic problems
associated with it. During the STG's training of the
Mercury astronauts at Langley, Houbolt was the one who
presented their course of lectures on space navigation. ,9
Houbolt especially studied one particular problem related to
rendezvous in space--the timing of the launch. NASA could
not launch a mission at any arbitrary time and be assured of
effecting a rendezvous with an orbiting spacecraft. To visu-
alize the problem, Houbolt built a gadget with a globe for the
Ea_ and a small ball on the end of a short piece of coat
hanger, all connected to a variable-ratio gearbox. It simulat-
ed a satellite at different altitudes and in different orbital
planes, enabling him to calculate the varying amounts of
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time it would take for the satellite to orbit around the revolv-
ing Earth. From his considerations of orbital mechanics, he
knew that a change in orbital plane at 25,000 feet per second
without the help of any sort of aerodynamic lift would
require an enormous amount of energy and realistically
could not be made. With this simple but ingenious model,
Houbolt saw how long one might have to wait---a period of
perhaps many days---to launch a rendezvous mission from
Cape Canaveral. But he also found a way to circumvent the
problem: if the orbital plane of the satellite could be made
just one or two degrees larger than the latitude of the launch
site, one could extend the launch "window" to four hours
every day. Thus, he began to understand how NASA could
get around the long waiting periods. 2°
The word quickly spread around Langley that Houbolt,
the aircraft structures specialist, was now "the ren-
dezvous man?' He even had a "license to rendezvous."
The Rand Corporation, a nonprofit think-tank organiza-
tion in southern California connected to Douglas
Aviation and interested in space rendezvous, presented
the "license" to a visiting Houbolt in early November
1959 as a jovial "pat on the back" after he had made a
successful rendezvous in Douglas's rendezvous simula-
tor. 2' Thus when NASA Langley created its steering
groups to study the problems of orbital space stations and
those of lunar exploration missions, Houbolt, already
recognized as a brilliant analyst, naturally emerged as the
one to provide the input about rendezvous.
The first of Houbolt's rendezvous committees was tied
to Langley's Manned Space Laboratory Group. Headed
by the Full-Scale Research Division's Mark R.
Nichols, an aerodynamics specialist who was reluctant
to accept the assignment, this group came to life in
the late summer of 1959. It was similar to Brown's
interdivisional Lunar Exploration Working Group,
except that it was larger and had committees of its own.
One of them, Houbolt's committee, was supposed to
investigate the matter of rendezvous as it pertained to
Earth-orbital operations. And it did--in a "loosely
organized and largely unscheduled" way--into the first
months of 1960. Serving on the committee were John
M. Eggleston, Arthur W. Vogeley, Max C. Kurbjun, and
W. Hewitt Phillips of the Aero-Space Mechanics
Division; John A. Dodgen and William C. Mace of the
Instrument Research Division; and John Bird and Clint
Brown of the Theoretical Mechanics Division? 2Given
the overlapping memberships and responsibilities
of the different committees and study groups created
during this increasingly busy and chaotic period, it is
no wonder that there has been so much confusion in the
historical record about how the concept of lunar-orbit
rendezvous first germinated in NASA and about who
deserves credit for what.
At one of the early meetings of the Manned Space
Laboratory Group on 18 September 1959, Houbolt
made a long statement on the rendezvous problem, one
of the first made anywhere inside the NASA family.
He insisted that his committee be allowed to study
rendezvous "in the broadest terms" possible because, as
he presciently argued, the technique was bound to play
a major role in almost any advanced space mission
NASA might initiate. _ Three months later, in December
1959, Houbolt appeared with other leading members of
the Manned Space Laboratory Group before a meeting
of the Goett Committee studying NASA's long-term
plans. He urged the adoption of a rendezvous-satellite
experiment that could "define and solve the problems
more clearly"--something similar to the essence of
NASA's later project, Gemini. Most members of the
Goett Committee were still focusing more narrowly on
a space station and a circumlunar mission; they showed
little interest at that time in his experiment idea?'
The second Houbolt rendezvous committee met for the
first time six months later, on 24 May 1960. This was one
year and one day before Kennedy's "landing on the
moon in this decade" speech and one week after repre-
sentatives from the Goddard and Marshall Space Flight
Centers and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory had met at
Langley (16-17 May 1961) for an intercenter review of
NASA's current rendezvous studies. At this meeting--at
which Houbolt gave the principal Langley presentation
(based on a paper he had just delivered at the national
aeronautical meeting of the Society of Automotive
Engineers in New York City, 5-8 April)--there was
"complete agreement" that rendezvous was "an impor-
tant problem area" that opened "many operational possi-
bilities" and warranted "significant study." The strength
of Houbolt's presentation made it obvious that of all the
NASA centers, Langley was "expending the greatest
effort on rendezvous" It had eleven studies under way,
compared to three at the Ames Research Center and two
each at the Lewis Research Center and the Flight
Research Center. The Marshall Space Flight Center had
an active interest in rendezvous only in connection with
advanced Saturn missions. With their "leanings toward
orbital operations," Wernher von Braun's people at
Marshall had done little work specifically on rendezvous
and were not prepared to talk about it. 25
This second rendezvous committee was part of the Lunar
Mission Steering Group created by Floyd L. Thompson,
who had become Langley Research Center Director in
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1960. Chairing the group was hypersonics specialist John
V. Becket, chief of the Aero-Physics Division. _ Becker's
organization incorporated the Brown group, with the
dynamic Brown himself serving as the chair of a commit-
tee on trajectories and guidance. Five other committees
were quickly organized, with Howard B. Edwards of the
Instrument Research Division chairing an instrumentation
and communications committee; Richard R. Heldenfels of
the Structures Research Division, a committee on struc-
tures and materials; Paul R. Hill of the Aero-Space
Mechanics Division, a committee on propulsion, flight test,
and dynamic loads; Eugene S. Love, Becker's assistant
chief of the Aero-Physics Division, a committee on reentry
aerodynamics, heating, configuration, and aeromedical
studies; and John C. Houbolt, the rendezvous committee.
Serving with Houbolt were John Bird and John Eggleston,
who were also members of his other rendezvous commit-
tee, plus Wilford E. Sivertson, Jr., of the Instrument
Research Division.
Becker's organization, as a whole, was supposed to take a
"very broad look at all possible ways of accomplishing
the lunar mission?' At the time, NASA was conceiving
it as a circumlunar rather than a landing mission. (By the
late summer of 1960, Lowell E. Hasel, the secretary of
Becker's study committee, was referring to the organiza-
tion in his minutes as the "LaRC Circumlunar Mission
Steering Group?') More specifically, the Becker group
wanted to determine whether there was any reason to quar-
rel with the STG general guidelines for lunar missions
established a month earlier, in April 1960. 27 Over the
course of the next six months, this group met six times,
sent representatives to NASA headquarters and the
Marshall Space Flight Center for consultation and presen-
tation of preliminary analyses, and generally educated
itself in the relevant technical areas. Its exploratory exper-
imental data eventually appeared in twelve Langley papers
presented at the first Industry-NASA Apollo Technical
Conference held in Washington, D.C., 18-20 July 1961.
Long before, however, Langley's Lunar Mission Steering
Group had discontinued its activities. In mid-November
1960, when the STG developed its formal Apollo
Technical Liaison Plan, which organized specialists in
each problem area from every NASA center, there was no
longer any need for the group, so it simply quit meeting, zs
Houbolt's First Crusade
In his paper presented before the Society of Automotive
Engineers, of all organizations, in April 1960, 41-year-old
John Cornelius Houbolt focused on "the problem of ren-
dezvous in space, involving, for example, the ascent of a
satellite or space ferry as to
make a soft contact with
another satellite or space
station already in orbit."
His analysis of "soft
rendezvous" could have
applied to a lunar mission,
but the paper did not
specifically refer to that
possibility? 9
However, Houbolt already John C Houbolt at the time of the
had been studying such an lunar-orbitrendezvousdebate.
application. This was
clear from the minutes of a meeting of Langley's
Manned Space Laboratory Group on 5 February 1960,
when Houbolt discussed the general requirements of a
"soft landing device" in a lunar mission involving
lunar-orbit rendezvous. This discussion took place even
though that particular rendezvous committee was sup-
posed to focus more narrowly on reaching and leaving an
Earth-orbiting space station. 3°
From this point on, Houbolt began to advertise the idea of
lunar-orbit rendezvous in different meetings and conversa-
tions. In the spring of 1960, he talked about landing on the
Moon with Robert O. Piland and various other members
of NASA's Space Task Group. During the same period, he
mentioned the lunar-orbit rendezvous concept to William
A. Mrazek, director of the Structures and Mechanics
Division at Marshall Space Flight Center, for whom he
had been helping evaluate the S-IV stage (consisting of
four uprated Centaur engines) of the Saturn rocket. 3_
By the early summer months of 1960, when the Lunar
Mission Steering Group first began holding meetings,
Houbolt already had discovered the advantages of a lunar
landing mission via lunar-orbit rendezvous. Intellectually
and emotionally, he had embraced the concept as his own.
Sometime during the previous months, while performing
"back-of-the-envelope"-type calculations to confirm how
much less rocket-boosting power NASA would require if it
went to the Moon via lunar-orbit rendezvous, the Langley
engineer had experienced a powerful technological enthu-
siasm akin to a religious experience. Three years later, in
a 1963 article, he described what happened: "Almost
simultaneously, it became clear that lunar orbit rendezvous
offered a chain reaction simplification on all 'back effects':
development, testing, manufacturing, erection, countdown,
flight operations, etc." Inside his head, everything "clicked"
--"all would be simplified?' Everything about an American
lunar landing would be made much easier. '°This is fantas-
tic;' he thought to himself. "If there is any idea we have to
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push, it is this one!'" In this moment of revealed truth arose
an ardent resolve: "I vowed to dedicate myself to the task"
From that moment on, until NASA's selection of the
mission mode for Project Apollo in July 1962, Houbolt
proved to be NASA's most dedicated, active, eloquent,
stubborn, and informed crusader for what came to be
known as "the LOR concept. ''32
Houbolt's first chance to "convert" others in terms of what
now he considered his LOR concept was in September
1960, when new NASA Associate Administrator Dr.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., toured the Langley Research
Center during an orientation visit. Seamans had a Ph.D. in
aeronautical engineering from MIT and was a former
member of a National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA) technical subcommittee on aircraft
stability and control. He had assumed the NASA position
on 1 September, and one of his first official duties was vis-
iting all of the agency's field centers to learn about their
programs and meet their personnel. One of the many peo-
ple he encountered at Langley was an excited John
Houbolt, who seized the moment to speak privately about
the advantages of LOR. In essence, he said that "we ought
to be thinking about using LOR in our way of going to
the Moon. m3
Bob Seamans reacted with interest. Although NASA had
no mandate from political leaders to begin a lunar
mission, NASA headquarters was seriously planning a
lunar landing program. In October 1960, it had formed
a small intercenter working group to establish a prelimi-
nary program for a lunar landing. Houbolt was Langley's
representative on this committee, which was chaired by
George Low. Low had been the primary lunar landing
enthusiast at NASA headquarters and a strong early
advocate of rendezvous methods as an alternative to the
direct ascent approach, which presupposed the use of the
anticipated gargantuan Nova rocket and which up to that
time had almost completely dominated NASA's thinking
about how to conduct a lunar-landing mission, j"
Knowing Low's preference for orbital staging tech-
niques, Seamans was inclined to listen carefully to
Houbolt's arguments for LOR.
Moreover, Seamans had previously been chief engineer
for the Radio Corporation of America's (RCA) Missile
and Electronics Division in Massachusetts and had been
involved in an Air Force study known as Project Saint--
an acronym from "satellite interceptor." This "quiet but
far-reaching" classified military project involved the
interception of satellites in Earth orbit. Because of this
earlier work, Seamans, who was exactly the same age as
Houbolt, was predisposed to listen to interesting ideas
about rendezvous techniques and maneuvers. Houbolt
explained to him how LOR would work even if less
weight than that of the entire spacecraft was left in a
parking orbit. If one just left the weight equivalent to
that of the spacecraft's heatshield, NASA could realize
some significant savings. Impressed with the notion of
how important it was to leave weight in orbit, and equal-
ly impressed with the zeal with which Houbolt
expressed that notion, Seamans invited the impassioned
Langley researcher to present his ideas formally before
his staff in Washington. 3_
Before that, however, Houbolt was to give two other
briefings on rendezvous. The first was in November 1960,
to the U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board at the
Pentagon. The second, on 10 December, was to leading
members of the Space Task Groulr--Paul Purser, Robert
Piland, Owen Maynard, Caldwell Johnson, James
Chamberlin, and Max Faget (Chair Robert R. Gilruth was
not present). During both talks, Houbolt spoke about all
the possible uses of rendezvous--in terms of both lunar
orbit (such as a manned lunar landing) and Earth orbit
(such as assembly of orbital units, personnel transfer to
and rescue retrieval from a space station, proper place-
ment of special-purpose satellites, and inspection and
interception of satellites). Houbolt tried to clarify how
rendezvous would be both inherently useful and techni-
cally feasible in many space missions. In other words--
and historians have missed this key point he was
advocating rendezvous in general, not just the LOR con-
cept. If Americans were going to land on the Moon with
existing rocket boosters, or even with the boosters that
were planned, then the United States would have to use a
combination of Earth-orbit rendezvous (EOR) and LOR.
Recalling his argument years later, Houbolt said, "We
would put up a component with a first booster; we
would put up another component with another booster;
then we would rendezvous the two of them in Earth
orbit. Then we would go to the Moon with this booster
system and perform the lunar-orbit rendezvous with the
remaining spacecraft. The whole reason for doing it this
way (via EOR) would be because the boosters were still
too small." At the same time, he was also championing
LOR. He lectured from charts showing a soft lunar land-
ing conducted with both the Saturn-class rockets then in
development as well as existing launch vehicles such as
Atlas or Langley's innovative little Scout rocket. He
concluded by emphasizing the "great advantage" of
LOR---how the Earth-boost payload in a lunar landing
mission would be reduced by a factor of 2 to 2.5. "I
pointed out over and over again" that if these boosters
could be made bigger, then NASA "could dispense with
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the Earth-orbit rendezvous portion and do it solely by
lunar-orbit rendezvous. ''36
Houbolt recalls that neither the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board nor the STG seemed overly interest-
ed. Nor did they seem overly hostile, however. It was
this apparently passive reaction to his advocacy of
LOR, which he was to experience more than a few
times in the coming months, that so frustrated
Houbolt and eventually helped push him to bold
action. Not all of the reaction was so passive. Some
of it, from intelligent and influential people inside
the space program, was strong, harshly worded, and
negative.
On 14 December 1960, Houbolt traveled to Washington
with a group of Langley colleagues to present the staff
at NASA headquarters the briefing he had promised
Bob Seamans three months earlier. All of the important
people were in the audience, from Administrator T.
Keith Glennan, Seamans, and Wernher von Braun on
down through the leadership of the STG. For fifteen
minutes, Houbolt moved carefully through his charts
and analysis. He concluded, as he had done in the ear-
lier briefings, with an enthusiastic statement about the
weight savings--a reduction of Earth payload by a fac-
tor of a "whopping" 2 to 2.5.
When he finished, a small man with a receding hairline
and a bow tie jumped up from the audience. Houbolt
knew all too well who he was: the intuitively brilliant and
hot-blooded Max Faget, his long-time Langley associate
and present member of the STG. "His figures lie," Faget
accused, rather nastily. "He doesn't know what he's
talking about."
Even in a "bull session" back at Langley, Fagers fiery
accusation would have been upsetting. But "in an open
meeting, in front of Houbolrs peers and supervisors," it
was "a brutal thing for one Langley engineer to say to
another. ''37 And Faget had not bothered to say this
to him four days earlier during the more private STG
management briefing at Langley, when Houbolt and the
others, who also were to give talks at headquarters
(Ciint Brown, John Bird, and Max Kurbjun), had
previewed their same, exact presentations. This time, he
carried his vocal objections out into the hallway, even
after the meeting was over.
Houbolt tried to stay calm, but clearly he was agitated.
He answered the charge simply by telling Faget that
he "ought to look at the study before [making] a
pronouncement like that. ''3_ It was an "ought to" that
Houboit would be passing on to many other LOR
skeptics before it was all over.
Curiously, at the same NASA headquarters briefing,
Clint Brown had made an earlier presentation, based
on a study he had conducted with Ralph W. Stone,
Jr., of the Theoretical Mechanics Division, showing a
general operational concept of an LOR plan for a
piloted lunar mission. Brown's basic idea was to
develop an early launch capability by combining a
number of existing rocket boosters, specifically the
Atlas, Centaur, and Scout. He also illustrated the
advantage of rendezvous for weight reduction over
the direct lunar mission. But curiously, Brown's
talk--unlike Houbolrs--did not provoke any strong
negative reaction. 39 Perhaps it was because Houbolt
gave a more explicit analysis of the advantages of
LOR over the direct approach. Perhaps it was
because Brown had given his presentation first and
Faget needed to build up some steam. Or it could
have been personal, with Faget simply liking Brown
and disliking Houbolt.
The Feelings Against
Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous
The basic premise of the LOR concept, which NASA
would eventually develop for Project Apollo, was to
fire an assembly of three spacecraft into Earth's orbit
on top of a single powerful (three-stage) rocket, the
Saturn V. This 50,000-pound-plus assembly would
include: a mother ship or command module; a service
module containing the fuel cells, attitude control sys-
tem, and main propulsion system; and a small lunar
lander or excursion module. Once in Earth's orbit, the
last stage of the Saturn rocket would fire and expend
itself, boosting the spacecraft and its crew of astro-
nauts-into its trajectory to the Moon. After braking
into lunar orbit via the small rockets aboard the ser-
vice module, two of the crew members would don
space suits and climb into the lunar excursion module
(LEM), detach it from the mother ship, and descend to
the lunar surface. The third crew member would
remain in the command module, maintaining a lonely
but busy vigil in lunar orbit. If all went well, a top
half, or "ascent stage," of the LEM would rocket back
up, using the ascent engine provided, and redock with
the command module. What remained of the lander
would then be discarded to the vast darkness of
space--or crashed onto the Moon, as was done in later
Apollo missions for seismic experiments--and the
astronauts would return home in their command ship.
MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY
One can summarize the LOR concept by referring to
three "only" statements:
1. Only a specially designed lunar module (the LEM)
would actually descend to the Moon's surface.
. Only a portion of that LEM, the so-called "ascent
stage," would retum to dock with the command mod-
ule in lunar orbit.
3. Only the command module, the Apollo capsule itself,
with its protective heatshield, would fall back to Earth.
Knowing what we know now--that Americans would
land on the Moon and return safely before the end of the
1960s, using the LOR method it might be hard to imag-
ine and appreciate the strength of feeling against the LOR
concept in the early 1960s. In retrospect, we know that
LOR enjoyed---as Brown, Michael, Dolan, and especial-
ly John Houbolt had said---several advantages over com-
petitor methods. It required less fuel, only half the
payload, and less brand-new technology; it did not need a
monstrous rocket, such as the proposed Nova for a direct
flight; and it called for only one launch from the Earth,
whereas one of LOR's chief competitors, "Earth-orbit
rendezvous" required two. Only the small, lightweight
LEM, not the entire spacecraft, would have to land on the
Moon; this perhaps was LOR's major advantage. Because
the lander would be discarded after use and would not
return to Earth, NASA could customize the LEM's design
for maneuvering flight in the lunar environment and for
landing softly on the Moon. In fact, NASA could tailor all
the modules of the Apollo spacecraft independently---and
without those tailorings compromising each other. One
spacecraft unit performing three jobs would have forced
some major compromises. But three units performing
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An early LOR spacecraft configuration.
three jobs, without compromise, was another LOR advan-
tage that no one at NASA could overlook.
In the early 1960s, however, all these advantages were
merely theoretical. On the other hand, the fear that
American astronauts might be left in an orbiting coffin
some 240,000 miles from home was quite real. If ren-
dezvous had to be part of the lunar mission, many felt
it should be conducted only in the Earth's orbit. If that
rendezvous failed, the threatened astronauts could be
brought back home simply by allowing the orbit of
their spacecraft to deteriorate. But if a rendezvous
around the Moon failed, the astronauts would be too
far away to be saved, because nothing could be done.
The morbid specter of dead astronauts sailing around
the Moon haunted the dreams of those responsible for
the Apollo program. It was a nightmare that made
objective evaluation of the LOR concept by NASA
unusually difficult.
It also was a nightmare that John Houbolt understood all
too well, but he recognized that all the alternative
schemes had serious pitfalls and dreadful possibilities. In
fact, he was certain that all the other options involved
even more perils. None of them offered a rescue possi-
bility. In contrast, LOR offered the chance of a rescue by
having two small landing modules, if NASA wished,
rather than just one. One lander could be reserved with
the orbiting mother ship and used only if the number-one
lander encountered serious trouble. Or, in the case of an
accident inside the command-and-service module, even
one attached LEM could serve as a type of "lifeboat."
(This actually did happen during Apollo 13, when, while
the spacecraft was outward bound and 200,000 miles
from the Earth, an explosion in one of the oxygen tanks
within the service module caused a leak in another oxy-
gen tank. NASA had an urgent life-threatening problem
that it could only solve because it had the LEM. The
astronauts headed home, without landing, temporarily
occupying the LEM.) Therefore, Houbolt could not
accept the charge that LOR was inherently more danger-
ous, but neither could he easily turn that charge aside.
It was an amazingly tempestuous intellectual and emo-
tional climate in which NASA would have to make per-
haps the most fundamental decision in its history. It was
a psychological obstacle that made the entire year of
1961 and the first seven months of 1962 the most hectic
and challenging period of John Houbolt's life. `°
On 5 January 1961, Houbolt again spoke about ren-
dezvous in Washington during the first afternoon of a
historic two-day meeting of the Space Exploration
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A comparison of the proposed mammoth Nova rocket with the very large Saturn C-5 and C-I launch vehicles.
Program Council at NASA headquarters. NASA had cre-
ated this council for "smoothing out technical and man-
agerial problems at the highest level." Chaired by
Associate Administrator Seamans, this council meeting
included, as it always did, all program office heads at
headquarters, the heads of all NASA field centers, and
their invited guests and speakers. The council had been
meeting quarterly since early 1960, but this first meeting
of 1961 was by far the most historic to date: it was the
first inside NASA to feature a full-scale, agency-wide
discussion of a piloted lunar landing. 4_
By the end of the first day of this meeting, everyone real-
ized that the mission mode for a human landing on the
Moon by NASA could be reduced to three major options:
direct ascent, which was still the front-runner;
Earth-orbit rendezvous (EOR), which was gaining
ground quickly; and lunar-orbit rendezvous (LOR), the
darkhorse on which only the most capricious gamblers in
NASA would have ventured a bet.
A different speaker addressed each option. First,
Marshall's impressive rocket pioneer from Germany,
Wernher von Braun, reviewed NASA's launch vehicle
program, with discussion on the advantages of
Earth-orbit rendezvous. This option involved launching
two pieces of hardware into space independently using
advanced Saturn rockets that were then under develop-
ment. The two pieces would rendezvous and dock in the
Earth's orbit. The modules that had joined up during the
rendezvous would allow for the assembly, fueling, and
detachment of a lunar mission vehicle. That augmented
ship would then proceed directly to the surface of the
Moon and, after exploration, return to the Earth. The
immediate advantage of Earth-orbit rendezvous, as yon
Braun clearly pointed out, was that it required a pair of
less powerful rockets that were already nearing the end
of their development--in other words, twice as many of
his early Saturns. The biggest pitfall, as with direct
ascent, was that there was not yet any clear concept of
how the spacecraft would actually make its landing. Of
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that essential maneuver, von Braun offered no details,
admitting that serious study would have to be conducted
very quickly.
Next, Melvyn Savage of the Office of Launch Vehicle
Programs at NASA headquarters talked about direct
ascent. This was basically the method that had been
described in science fiction novels and shown in
Hollywood movies. A massive rocket, roughly the size
of a battleship, would be fired directly to the Moon,
land, and then blast off for home directly from the lunar
surface. The trip would be like that of a chartered bus,
moving from point A to point B and back to A again
in one huge booster vehicle, the proposed twelve-
million-pound-thrust Nova rocket.
Late in the afternoon, Houbolt discussed rendezvous and
highlighted the unappreciated wonders of his darkhorse
candidate. To him, the advantages of LOR and the disad-
vantages of the other two options were clear. Any single
big rocket, such as Nova, that had to carry and lift all the
fuel necessary for leaving the Earth's gravity, braking
against the Moon's gravity as well as leaving it, and brak-
ing back down into the Earth's gravity again was not the
most practical, especially if the mission must be accom-
plished soon. The development of a rocket that mammoth
would take too long, and the expense would be enormous.
In Houbolt's opinion, Earth-orbit rendezvous was better
than direct ascent but not nearly as good as LOR. Once
the lunar-bound spacecraft left its rendezvous station
around the Earth, the rest of its mission would be accom-
plished exactly as with direct ascent. NASA's astronauts
would still have to land an incredibly heavy and large
vehicle on the surface of the Moon. The business of back-
ing such a large stack of machinery down to the Moon
and "eyeballing" it to a pinpoint soft landing---on what at
the time was still a virtually unknown lunar surface
would be incredibly tricky and dangerous. Those few
NASA researchers, such as Arthur W. Vogeley of
Langley's Aero-Space Mechanics Division, who had been
thinking about the terrors of landing such a behemoth
(and getting the astronauts down from the top of it using
an inside elevator), understood that there were no satis-
factory answers to that approach. 4_
A diagramfrora 1962 demonstrating the three basic approaches considered for lunar landing missions.
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There were other talks that day, including an introduction
by George Low, head of NASA headquarters lunar land-
ing task force, and a technical talk by Houbolt's nemesis
Max Faget that outlined the hardware and booster
requirements for several possible types of lunar missions.
But everyone walked away from the meeting under-
standing that if the United States were to reach the Moon
by the end of the decade, NASA would have to evaluate
the comparative benefits and risks of these three major
options and somehow quickly pick the one that would
work. 43At this point, the odds were excellent that the
choice--if one were to be made--would be either direct
ascent, which seemed simplest in concept, or Earth-orbit
rendezvous. The LOR concept was a "long shot"--
almost not worthy of mention for many NASA officials.
The Space Task Group's
Early Skepticism
In the early months of 1961, the STG, still at Langley,
was preoccupied with the first Mercury flight and the
hope--soon to be crushed by Vostok 1--that an
American astronaut would be the first human in space.
When any of its members had a rare moment to consider
rendezvous, it was thought of "as one of several classes
of missions around which a Mercury program follow-on
might be built.''
On 10 January 1961, four days after the meeting of the
Space Exploration Program Council, Houbolt and three
members of the Theoretical Mechanics Division--<livi-
sion chief Clint Brown, Ralph Stone, and Manuel J.
"Jack" Queijo---attended an informal meeting at Langley
with three members of STG's Flight Systems Division--
H. Kurt Strass, Owen E. Maynard, and Robert L. O'Neal.
Langley Associate Director Charles Donlan, Gilruth's
former chief assistant, also attended. It was at this meet-
ing that Houbolt, Brown, and the others tried to persuade
the men from the STG (Donlan had only recently been
reassigned to Langley from the STG) that a rendezvous
experiment belonged in the Apollo program and that
LOR was preferable if any realistic plans for a lunar
landing were to be made. 4_
They were not persuaded. Although the STG engineers
received the analysis more politely than Max Faget had the
month earlier, all four admitted quite frankly that the claims
about the weight savings were "too optimistic" Owen
Maynard remembers that he and his colleagues initially
viewed the LOR concept as "the product of pure theorists'
deliberations with little practicality." In essence, they
agreed with Faget's charge, although they did not actually
say it, that Houbolt's figures did "lie" In advertising the
Earth-weight savings of LOR and the size reduction of the
booster needed for the lunar mission, Houbolt and the oth-
ers were failing to factor in, or at least greatly underesti-
mating, the significant extra complexity, and thus added
weight, of the systems and subsystems that LOR's modu-
lar spacecraft would require? 6
This criticism was central to the early skepticism toward
the LOR concept--both inside and outside the STG. Even
Marshall's Wernher von Braun initially shared the senti-
ment: "John Houbolt argued that if you could leave part of
your ship in orbit and don't soft land all of it on the moon
and fly it out of the gravitational field of the moon again,
you can save takeoff weight on earth." "That's pretty
basic" von Braun recalled later in an oral history. "But if
the price you pay for that capability means that you have
to have one extra crew compartment, pressurized, and two
additional guidance systems, and the electrical supply for
all that gear, and you add up all this, will you still be on the
plus side of your trade-off?" Until the analysis was per-
formed (and there are some former NASA engineers who
still argue today that "this trade-off has never been realis-
tically evaluated"), 47 no one could be sure but many
NASA people suspected---that LOR would prove far too
complicated. "The critics in the early debate murdered
Houbolt;' von Braun remembered sympathetically. _
Houbolt recalls this January 1961 meeting with the STG
as a "friendly, scientific discussion" He, Brown, and the
others did what they could to counter the argument that the
weight of a modular spacecraft would prove excessive.
Using an argument taken from automobile marketing, they
stated that the lunar spacecraft would not necessarily have
to be "plush"; an "economy" or even "budget" model
might be able to do the job. One such "budget model,"
which the STG engineers did not seriously consider,
was one of John Bird's lunar bugs, "a stripped-down,
2,500-pound version in which an astronaut descended
on an open platform. ''9 In answer to the charge that a
complicated modular spacecraft would inevitably grow
much heavier than estimated, Houbolt retaliated that
the estimated weight of a direct-ascent spacecraft would
no doubt increase during development, making it a less
competitive option in comparison with rendezvous.
But in the end, all the substantive differences between the
two groups of engineers went out the window. All Houbolt
could say to the STG representatives was "you don't know
what you're talking about," and all they could say to him
was the same thing. "It wasn't a fight in the violent sense"
reassures Houbolt. "It was just differences in scientific
opinion about it.''_°
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Whether or not this skeptical response to that day's argu-
ments in favor of LOR indicated any general STG senti-
ment in early 1961 has been a matter of serious
behind-the-scenes debate among the NASA participants.
Houbolt has argued that the STG consistently opposed
LOR and had to be convinced from the outside, by
Houbolt himself, after repeated urgings, that it was the
best mission mode for a lunar landing. Leading members
of the STG, notably Gilruth and Donlan, have argued that
that was not really the case. They say that the STG was
too busy preparing for the Mercury flights even to both-
er thinking seriously about lunar studies until after
Kennedy's commitment. Gilruth recalls that when
Houbolt first approached him "with some ideas about
rendezvousing Mercury capsules in earth orbit" as "an
exercise in space technology," he did react negatively. It
was a "diversion from our specified mission," according
to Gilruth, and therefore not something on which he, as
the head of Project Mercury, had any time to reflect. _'
According to Gilruth, it was only later that he found out
that Houbolt was interested in LOR. By that time, in
early 1961, NASA had started studying the requirements
of a manned lunar landing through such task forces as the
Low Committee, and the STG did its best to follow suit.
When it did think seriously about a lunar program, espe-
cially about that most critical operation of actually land-
ing astronauts on the Moon, LOR gained "early
acceptance.., notwithstanding the subsequent debates
that erupted in numerous headquarters committees. ''52
"I was very much in favor of that mode of flight to the
moon from the very beginning" Gilruth has since claimed.
"I recall telling our people that LOR seemed the most
promising mode to me far more promising than either
the direct ascent or the earth orbital rendezvous modes"
The most important thing in planning for a lunar landing
program was to minimize the risk of the actual operation.
Thus, LOR was the best choice among the contending
modes because it alone permitted the use of a smaller vehi-
cle specifically designed for the job. In Gilruth's view, he
was always encouraging to Houbolt. In his estimation, he
felt all along that "the Space Task Group would be the key
in carrying the decision through to the highest echelons of
NASA;' and "of course, this proved to be the case. ''53
Houbolt accepts little of these assertions; in fact, he "vio-
lently disagrees" with them. He points out that on several
occasions in late 1960 he had briefed leading members of
the STG about his LOR ideas. He also asserts that Gilruth
had to know about them, that the STG had ignored and
resisted them as too optimistic, and that the STG would
continue to ignore and resist them and insist strongly on
the need for developing large Nova-class boosters for a
while. As evidence, he points to many subsequent
instances where his ideas were summarily discounted by
the STG and to different expressions of resistance from
key STG members. One such statement came from Gilruth
in an official letter as late as September 1961.
"Rendezvous schemes are and have been of interest to
the Space Task Group and are being studied," Gilruth
informed NASA headquarters on 12 September.
"However, the rendezvous approach itself will, to some
extent, degrade mission reliability and flight safety."
Rendezvous schemes such as Houbolt's "may be used as a
crutch to achieve early planned dates for launch vehicle
availability" Gilruth warned. Their advocates propose
them '_o avoid the difficulty of developing a reliable Nova
class launch vehicle "'_
Houbolt felt strongly that if he could just persuade
Gitruth's people to "do their homework" on rendezvous,
"then they too would become convinced of its merits."
But for months, he could not get them----or anyone else--
to do that. There was "virtually universal opposition--no
one would accept it--they would not even study it,' In
his view, it was "my perseverance, and solely mine" that
caused the STG and various other groups to study and
realize finally "the far-sweeping merits of the plan." It
was "my own in-depth analysis" and "my crusading"
based on that analysis that, above all else, later "paved
the way to the acceptance of the scheme,' In Houbolt's
view, if not for his constant badgering, NASA might have
tried to reach the Moon some other way.' s
In early 1961, when the Low Committee announced its
plan for a piloted lunar landing and its aspiration for that
bold mission to be made part of Project Apollo, it definite-
ly seemed that NASA was still resisting LOR. In outlining
the requirements for an ambitious lunar flight, the commit-
tee's chief recommendation was to focus on the direct
approach to the Moon, leaving rendezvous out. LOR was
not discussed at all. Low remembers that during the time
of his committee's deliberations, he asked one of its
members, E.O. Pearson, Jr., to visit John Houbolt at
Langley and "to advise the Committee whether we should
give consideration to the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode,'
Pearson, the assistant chief of the Aerodynamics and Flight
Mechanics Research Division at NASA headquarters,
returned with the answer, "No" LOR "was not the proper
one to consider for a lunar landing,' A rendezvous 240,000
miles from home, when rendezvous had never been
demonstrated--Shepard's suborbital flight had not even
been made yet--seemed, literally and figuratively, "like an
extremely far-out thing to do" Maybe LOR would save
some weight; maybe it would not. But even if it did, it
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John Houbolz explaining LOR principles at a briefing in 1962.
was not the best approach; too many critical maneuvers
would have to be made after sending the spacecraft with
its precious human cargo on its lunar trajectory. If any
rendezvous had to be included, it would be much better
in the Earth's orbit, where everything about the spacecraft
could be thoroughly checked out and the craft brought
back safely with its human occupants if something
went wrong. _
Thus the Low Committee, in early 1961, recognizing that
it would be too expensive to develop and implement
more than one lunar landing mission mode, made its
"chief recommendation": NASA should focus on direct
ascent. "This mistaken technical judgment was not
Houbolt's fault," Low admitted years later, "but rather
my fault in trusting a single Committee member instead
of having the entire Committee review Houbolt's studies
and recommendations. ''57
Mounting Frustration
Everything that happened in early 1961 reinforced John
Houbolt's belief that NASA was dismissing the LOR
concept without giving it due consideration. On 20
January, he gave another long rendezvous talk at NASA
headquarters. In this briefing, he displayed analysis
showing a scenario for a lunar landing using Saturn
rockets and outlined a simplified rendezvous scheme
that had been worked out by Art Vogeley and Lindsay J.
Lina of the Guidance and Control Branch of Langley's
Aero-Space Mechanics Division. He also mentioned
some preliminary Langley ideas for developing
fixed-base simulators by which to study the require-
ments for lunar orbit, landing, and rendezvous, s8Like so
many of his earlier presentations, it was received pas-
sively, without much enthusiasm. On 27-28 February,
NASA held an intercenter meeting on rendezvous in
Washington, but no presentation on LOR was made by
Houbolt or anyone else. As if by a political consensus,
the subject was not even raised. This absence prompted
one concerned headquarters official, Bernard Maggin
from the Office of Aeronautical and Space Research, to
write Houbolt a memo a few days later in which he com-
mented on the lack of consideration for LOR by NASA,
especially by the STG. 59
Politics, of an institutional sort, were involved in the
unfolding lunar landing mission mode debate. The
people and organizations involved in the building of
the big rockets were interested in direct ascent and
even in Earth-orbit rendezvous. That type of ren-
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dezvous, although not requiring the super-big Nova
booster, would still require two or more big Saturns per
mission. Abe Silverstein, the director of the Office of
Space Flight Programs at NASA headquarters, was
working primarily from his experience as the former
head of the Lewis Research Center, which was the old
NACA propulsion research laboratory now heavily
involved in rocket development. Wernher yon Braun
had to be thinking about the best interests of his
Marshall Space Flight Center, which was primarily
responsible at that time for developing the Saturn fam-
ily of launch vehicles. What then were the politics?
They centered around the concern over where the work
for the overall lunar program was going to be per-
formed. Was it to be conducted primarily by the people
and organizations capable of building, managing, and
launching very big rockets? By von Braun's team in
Huntsville, which would need two to eight Saturn
1-class boosters to get enough weight up into Earth
orbit to get to the Moon and back without having to
perform LOR? 6° Or by somebody else?
For the most part, Langley management, with no such
vested interest, sat on the "sidelines." No matter which
mission mode was implemented, its researchers and
wind tunnels would have plenty of work to support
the programY
In some articles and history books on Project Apollo, the
LOR concept has been called a pet concept of the
Langley Research Center. That was not at all the case.
Even within Langley, LOR was embraced only by a
small but vocal minority. Langley management did not
support LOR until after the STG and the rest of NASA
did. The personal opinion of Center Director Floyd
Thompson, as well as that of most of his senior people,
mirrored that of the STG" LOR was too complicated and
risky. It was better to use direct ascent or Earth-orbit
rendezvous, u
Houbolt was a brilliant engineering analyst--and an ener-
getic, persistent, and often eloquent advocate of the causes
he espoused--but he was not an overly shrewd
behind-the-scenes player of institutional politics. Faced
with the impasse of early 1961, his first instinct was simply
to find more sound and logical retorts to the criticisms he
had been hearing. With the help of Brown, Vogeley,
Michael, Bird, Kurbjun, and a few others, he developed
more elaborate and detailed studies of "his" lunar landing
mission, along with detailed weight-savings analyses.
Somehow, he felt, there had to be a way to circumvent the
problem and convince the agency that it was making a big
mistake in dismissing LOR.
On 19 April 1961, he was to give another briefing on ren-
dezvous to the STG. Hoping to package his argument more
convincingly, he turned to the use of the so-called "admi-
ral's page:' This was the established Navy practice of using
a short, visually convenient executive summary so that "the
admiral" would not have to "wade through the morass" of
a long report. For his STG briefing, Houbolt placed sixteen
pages worth of charts, data plots, drawings, and outlined
analyses--taken from his own analysis as well as material
supplied by Langley's Bird, Kurbjun, and Vogeley-----onto
one seventeen-by-twenty-two-inch foldout sheeL The title
of his foldout was, "Manned Lunar Landing Via
Rendezvous" and its cover included a close-up telescopic
photograph of the Moon. A number of the important peo-
ple attending the meeting received a copy of the printed cir-
cular and could follow along from box to box. _
As had been the case in Houbolt's earlier presentations, this
one also addressed both Earth-orbit rendezvous and LOR,
but it clearly stated a preference for LOR. In this talk, how-
ever, he advocated, for the first time, two specific projects
for which he supplied project names and acronyms. He
called the first ("Project 1") MORAD ('Manned Orbital
Rendezvous and Docking"). This was his old idea for a
modest flight "experiment" as a follow-on to Mercury that
would "establish confidence" in spaceflight rendezvous
techniques---a small payload from a Scout rocket serving as
a target vehicle for a maneuvering Mercury capsule in the
F_arth's orbit. He called the second ("Project 2") MALLIR
("Manned Lunar Landing Involving Rendezvous"). It was
this project, naturally, that contained the essence of the con-
troversial LOR scheme?'
The last box of the foldout contained Houbolt's recom-
mendations for "Immediate Action Required." For
MORAD, he wanted NASA to give a quick "go-ahead"
so that Langley could proceed with a work statement
before issuing a study contract by industry. For
MALLIR, he wanted NASA "to delegate responsibility
to the Space Task Group" so that the STG would have to
give "specific and accelerated consideration" to the pos-
sibility of including rendezvous as part of Project Apollo.
In response to the STG's apparent resistance to his ren-
dezvous ideas and its current discretionary freedom to
treat rendezvous as part of Apollo on a "will also consid-
er" basis, Houbolt wanted a NASA directive that made
rendezvous integral to an accepted project. In other
words, he was asking for something that would make the
STG, finally, give rendezvous the attention that it merit-
ed. "I simply wanted people to study the problems and
look at [them], and then make a judgment, but they
wouldn't even do that," Houbolt remembers with some of
his old frustration. "It was that strange a position. ''65
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Nothing immediately resulted from either of his propos-
als. Again, the reaction seemed to him mostly negative,
as if the STG still wanted no part of his ideas. His frus-
tration mounted. "I could never find a real answer to why
they wouldn't even consider it," Houbolt laments.
Perhaps it was the "not-invented-here" syndrome.
Perhaps it was just because he was an "outsider" who
was "rocking the boat on their own thinking, and they
didn't want anybody to do that. ''_ Or perhaps, looking at
it psychologically, the STG was not prepared to think
seriously about such an incredibly bold and seemingly
treacherous idea when they were not even sure they
could make their own--perhaps more credible, but still
difficult--Mercury program a complete success. In other
words, Mercury "was proving so troublesome that ren-
dezvous, however simple in theory, seemed very far
away." Houbolt was never sure. 67
At this April 1961 briefing, however, a solitary
STG engineer did demonstrate a clear and exceptional
interest in Houbolrs rendezvous analysis. James
Chamberlin approached Houbolt after the meeting and
asked him for an extra copy of the foldout sheet and "any-
thing else he had on rendezvous" Interestingly, both
Houbolt and Chamberlin recall Chamberlin telling him that
he had known about Langley's rendezvous work but that
this was the first time he had heard any of the details about
the lunar orbit version, u One might indeed wonder then
how widely the information from Houbolt's previous talks
had spread within the STG. Perhaps it is significant that
Chamberlin was not one of Gilruth's old associates from
NACA. He was one of the relative newcomers--and a very
talented one (Chamberlin had been chief of design for the
Avro Arrow aircraft, an advanced airplane canceled by the
Canadian government)--whom the STG had recruited
from Canada in late 1959.
President Kennedy's Commitment
Houbolt's briefing to the STG came at the end of a
humbling week for America. On 12 April, the Soviets
beat the United States in sending the first human into
space, cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin. Three days later, with
President Kennedy's hesitant approval, a confused and
ultimately humiliated invasion force prepared by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) landed at Cuba's
Bay of Pigs, only to be driven back quickly by an unex-
pectedly efficient army of 20,000 led by communist Fidel
Castro. Pierre Salinger, Kennedy's articulate press secre-
tary, later called this "the three grimmest days" of the
Kennedy presidency. It was a period of national crisis that
proved in same ways to be more urgent than even the
troubled aftermath of the Sputniks. _
Up to this time, NASA had been preparing for a lunar
landing mission as its long-term goal in space. Some
visionaries in NASA, such as George Low, wanted
to do it sooner rather than later and were working to
convince NASA leadership, now headed by a new
Administrator, James E. Webb (Glennan resigned in
early 1961, with the change from a Republican to a
Democratic administration), that such a program should
be pushed at the politicians. Not all the politicians
needed to be pushed. Most notably, Vice President
Lyndon B. Johnson was pressing NASA for a larger and
more ambitious space program that included a lunar
landing program. _° President Kennedy was actually the
one who needed to be convinced. The Gagarin flight
and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, followed by the welcome
relief and excitement of Alan Shepard's successful
Mercury flight on 5 May, were enough to convince him.
Sputniks I and II had occurred during the previous
Republican administration and had helped the dynamic
young senator from Massachusetts beat former Vice
President Richard M. Nixon in the 1960 election. But
now, in just the past month, Kennedy's "New Frontier"
had been undermined by crisis. The confidence of the
American people needed to be restored. Something had
to provoke the country into rebounding from its recent
second-place finishes in the space race and national
humiliation. 7' On 25 May John Kennedy announced
that landing American astronauts on the Moon was the
way to restore confidence.
Houbolt's First Letter to Seamans
Six days before Kennedy's historic announcement, and
oblivious that it was coming, John Houbolt sent "a hurried
non-edited and limited note" of three single-spaced pages
to Robert Seamans at NASA headquarters. Confident
from past meetings that Associate Administrator Seamans
was greatly interested in the subject of rendezvous,
Houbolt took the liberty of going above several organiza-
tional layers and around his superiors to communicate
with him directly.
His message was straightforward and not overly passion-
ate. The situation with respect to the development of new
launch vehicles was "deplorable"; the Satums "should
undergo major structural modifications," and there was
"no committed booster plan" beyond Saturn. Furthermore,
NASA was still not attending to the use of rendezvous in
the planned performance of the Apollo mission. "I do not
wish to argue" whether "the direct way" or "the ren-
dezvous way" is best, Houbolt reassured Seamans. But
"because of the lag in launch vehicle developments," it
seemed to him that "the only way that will be available to
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A high-angle view of the Saturn V launch vehicle that was uaedfor the
Apollo 12 mission to the Moon in 1969.
us in the next few years is the rendezvous way." For this
reason alone, it was "mandatory" that '_'endezvous be as
much in future plans as any item, and that it be attacked
vigorously. 'm If NASA continued to dismiss LOR totally
as it had been, someday there were going to be sorry
NASA engineers.
If Houbolt had known that an ad hoc task group at
NASA headquarters was at that moment concluding that
rendezvous had no place in the lunar landing program, his
letter to Seamans would have carried a higher sense of
urgency. But there is nothing in his letter to suggest that
Houbolt knew anything about the meetings of the so-called
Fleming Committee. Established by Seamans on 2 May,
the job of this committee was to determine, in only four
weeks, whether a lunar landing by astronauts was in fact
possible and how much it would cost. Chaired by NASA's
Assistant Administrator for Programs, William A. Fleming,
who---unlike George Low--was known to be neutral on
the ideas of a lunar landing and the method for doing it, this
committee eventually recommended a lunar landing pro-
gram based on a three-stage Nova. In essence, the Fleming
Committee "avoided the question of rendezvous versus
direct ascent." Seeing "no reason to base its study on a risky
and untried alternative"--and apparently not seeing with
equal clarity that going to the Moon with a huge and
unproven launch vehicle was also "risky and untried"--the
committee spent all its time trying to choose between
solid-fuel and liquid-fuel propellants for the Nova stages. 73
Houbolt and the other LOR advocates at Langley would
have been dismayed. To them, it had been clear for some
time that developing the rendezvous concept was "the
obvious thing" to do before a lunar mission. But to so
many others, it was still an absurdly complicated and
sporty proposition.
Still others, such as Bob Seamans, were not sure what to
think. On 25 May, after hearing President Kennedy's
speech, Seamans appointed yet another ad hoc committee
"to assess a wide variety of possible ways for
executing a manned lunar landing" Whether Houbolt's let-
ter of six days earlier played any major direct role in
prompting Seamans to create this new committee, to be
chaired by Bruce T. Lundin, an Associate Director at the
Lewis Research Center, is not certain. But it surely con-
tributed to it, as two pieces of circumstantial evidence seem
to indicate. Houbolt still believes that Seamans created the
Lundin Committee specifically because of his letter. "The
story I got [from somebody else at NASA Headquarters]
was that my letter jolted Seamans, and he got up at five
o'clock in the morning, got on the phone, called several
people and said, 'Be at my office at seven o'clock.'... And
then they formed the Lundin Committee:' There are no
documents to support Houbolt's version of the story, but
based on what Seamans has said about the formation of the
Lundin Committee, there is no doubt that Houbolt's letter
did contribute directly to its establishment--perhaps not as
exclusively as Houbolt has heard. First, in explaining why
a new task force was necessary, Seamans pointed out to his
directors of Advanced Research Programs (Ira H. Abbott)
and Launch Vehicle Programs (Don R. Ostrander) that the
Fleming Committee was finding it necessary "to restrict its
considerations to a limited number of techniques by which
it is feasible to accomplish the mission in the shortest pos-
sible time." Consequently, there were "numerous other
approaches"---and he specifically mentioned the use of
rendezvous--that were not currently being assessed.
Second, Seamans wrote back to Houbolt on 2 June, thank-
ing him for his comments and reassuring the distressed
Langley researcher that "the problems that concern you are
of great concern to the whole agency." NASA
Headquarters had just organized "some intensive study
programs" Seamans informed him, without mentioning
the Fleming or Lundin Committees by name. These pro-
grams "will provide us a base for decisions. ''7'
It is not true, as some historians have said, that
Seamans made sure that Houbolt was on the Lundin
Committee." Houbolt was not an official member of
that committee; one of Floyd Thompson's assistants,
Laurence K. Loftin, Jr., was Langley's representative,
although he apparently did not attend all the meetings.
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But Houbolt did meet with and talk to the committee
several times; in fact, in his view, he was "the real
Langley representative" because Loftin did not attend
as regularly as he did. TM
The idea behind the Lundin Committee, at least as
Seamans had expressed it, was to take an open-minded
look into the alternative "modes" for getting to the
Moon, primarily those involving "mission staging by
rendezvous" and "alternative Nova vehicles." From its
initial meeting, however, that idea seems to have been
seriously compromised. Larry Loftin, who attended the
opening meeting in early June 1961, remembers that
Seamans came in the first day and "sort of gave us our
marching orders." Then Abe Silverstein, director of the
Office of Space Flight Programs at NASA headquarters,
came in to address the members. Silverstein said:
Well, look fellas, 1 want you to understand something.
I've been right most of my life about things, and if you
guys are going to talk about rendezvous, any kind of
rendezvous, as a way of going to the Moon, forget it. I've
heard all those schemes and I don't want to hear any
more of them, because we're not going to the Moon
using any of those schemes.
And with those words of warning and damnation, which
completely violated the reason for having the committee
in the first place, the usually masterful but, in this case,
self-righteous Silverstein "stomped out of the room. ''77
To its credit, the Lundin Committee disregarded
Siiverstein's admonition and instead considered a broad
range of different rendezvous schemes. With a complete
analysis of the rendezvous problems by Houbolt and
assorted insights from invited analysts both from inside
and outside NASA, the group studied mission profiles
involving rendezvous in Earth orbit, in transit to the
Moon, in lunar orbit before landing, in lunar orbit after
takeoff from the Moon, and in both Earth and lunar
orbit. It even considered the fantastic idea of a
"lunar-surface rendezvous." This involved launching a
fuel cache and a few other unmanned components of a
return spacecraft to the Moon's surface--a payload of
about 5,000 pounds--and then landing astronauts sepa-
rately in a second spacecraft whose fuel supply would
be exhausted just getting there. The notion, as absurd as
it now sounds, was that the landed astronauts would
find the previously deposited hardware (homing bea-
cons previously landed as part of the unmanned
Surveyor program were to make pinpoint landings pos-
sible) and then assemble and fuel a new spacecraft for
the return trip. Television monitoring equipment would
check everything out before sending astronauts from
the Earth to the landing area via the second spacecraft.
Houbolt thought this was "the most harebrained idea" he
had ever heard. In the committee's final "summary rat-
ing" of the comparative value of the different rendezvous
concepts, however, lunar-surface rendezvous finished
only slightly lower than did his LOR. One anonymous
committee member (most likely the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory representative) even picked lunar-surface
rendezvous as his first choice. 78
As Houbolt remembers bitterly, the Lundin Committee
"turned down LOR cold." In the final rating made by the
six voting committee members (Loftin voted, Houbolt
did not), LOR finished a distant third--with no first
place votes, only one second, two thirds, two fourths, and
one fifth or last place. Far ahead of it were two different
low-Earth-orbit rendezvous schemes, the first one using
two to three Saturn C-3 boosters and the other involving
a Saturn C-I plus the Nova. Both concepts were strong-
ly favored by NASA Marshall, which by this time had
embraced the idea of Earth-orbit rendezvous for its
potential technological applications to the development
of an orbiting space station. 79
Houbolt was crushed when he heard the results. Having
LOR placed at the same level of disdain as the ridiculous
lunar-surface rendezvous was especially insulting. He had
given the Lundin Committee his full-blown pitch, com-
plete with the foldout sheet and slides. "They'd say, 'That
sounds pretty good, John,' but then the next morning the
same guys would come up and say, 'John, that's no good.
We don't like it at all.' " For Houbolt, it was a perverse
reaction to figure out. There would be an initial favorable
reaction, but then "overnight, completely negative. ''8°
Loftin reflects back on the general fear and pessimism
about LOR that ultimately ruled over the committee:
We thought it was too risky. Remember in 1961 we
hadn't even orbited Glenn yet. We certainly had done
no rendezvous yet. And to put this poor bastard out
there, separate him in a module, let him go down to the
surface and then fire him back up and expect him to
rendezvous. He didn't get a second chance; it had to
be dead right the first time. I mean that just seemed
like a bit much.
Moreover, Loftin and the others believed--incorrectly--
that there was no real way of performing a rescue mis-
sion using LOR. In Earth's orbit, if things did not go
right, then NASA might still be able to save its astro-
nauts. In his gut, Loftin felt along with the others that the
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idea of LOR was just "kind of absurd. ''_' It was an uneasy
feeling that made it difficult for the Lundin Committee to
acknowledge that all the other options entailed more
complicated problems.
As discouraging as everything had been for John
Houbolt up to this point, things quickly got worse. On
20 June, ten days after the Lundin Committee delivered
its recommendations, Bob Seamans formed yet another
task force, chaired by his assistant director of Launch
Vehicle Programs, Donald H. Heaton. Following up on
the summary ratings and recommendations of the
Lundin Committee, Seamans asked Heaton's group to
focus on Earth-orbit rendezvous, establishing the pro-
gram plans and the supporting resources needed to
accomplish the manned lunar landing mission using
rendezvous techniques? 2 Trying to stay within those
guidelines, Heaton refused to let Houbolt, an official
member of his committee (Langley's W. Hewitt Phillips
also served on it), even talk about LOR.
Houbolt felt himself being caught in a bizarre trap of
someone else's making. He was one of the strongest
believers in rendezvous in the country--he was not
against Earth-orbit rendezvous, he was also in favor of
it. He had just returned from his well-received formal
presentation on both mission modes at an international
spaceflight symposium in France." But he and his
Langley associates had conducted the analysis, and they
knew that LOR would work even better than Earth-orbit
rendezvous for a lunar landing. So he pleaded with
Heaton that during the committee's study of rendezvous
in Earth orbit, it also should study LOR in comparison.
Heaton simply answered, "We're not going to do that,
John. It's not in our charter." Then Heaton challenged,
"If you feel strongly enough about it, write your own
lunar-orbit [minority] report "'_'
Houbolt eventually did just that. Heaton's report, which
was published in late August, concluded that
Earth-orbit rendezvous "offers the earliest possibility
for a successful manned lunar landing? '85In postulating
the design of the spacecraft that would make that sort of
lunar mission, however, the Heaton Committee pre-
viewed a baseline configuration that Houbolt regarded
as a "beast." It involved "some five different pieces of
hardware that were going to be assembled in the
Earth-orbit rendezvous," Houbolt remembers. "It was a
great big long cigar." In his opinion, such an unwieldy
concept "would hurt the cause of rendezvous." NASA
engineers, especially in the STG, would read the
Heaton report and say, "Well, we knew it all the time;
these rendezvous guys are nuts. ''_
Or they were being driven nuts. The summer of 1961 was
the busiest in the lives of many NASA engineers, cer-
tainly in John Houbolt's. "I was living half the time in
Washington, half the time on the road, dashing back and
forth. ''87 In mid-July, he was to be in Washington again,
to give a talk at the Industry-NASA Apollo Technical
Conference. This important meeting was to include
about 300 potential Project Apollo contractors. It was so
important that Langley management, in association with
the STG, in the tradition of the NACA-NASA annual
inspections, was holding a formal rehearsal of all its pre-
sentations prior to the conference.
Houbolt was to give his talk at the end of the day of
rehearsals because he had another NASA meeting earlier
that day in Washington. "I was to rash out to the airport at
Washington National, get on the airplane, they were
to pick me up here and then bring me to where they
were having the rehearsals" However, when he arrived
breathless at the airport, the airplane could not take off. In
refueling the aircraft, the ground crew had spilled fuel on
one of the tires, and the Federal Aviation Administration
would not let the plane take off until the tire had been
changed. That made Houbolt a little late---and the STG
member waiting for him a little impatient. '`They dashed
me back to the conference room, and with all of the other
rehearsals finished, "everybody was sort of twiddling their
thumbs," complaining "where the hell is Houbolt. "r'
After a brief apology, Houbolt began his talk. Up until
the end, he purposefully said nothing specifically about
LOR and talked about rendezvous in general. Then he
said he had three or four final slides. "There is a very
interesting possibility that rendezvous offers" Houbolt
ventured, similar to a lawyer who was trying to slip in
some evidence that he knew the judge would not allow,
"and that is how to go to the moon in a very simplified
way." He then described the whole LOR concept.
People listened politely and thanked him when he had
finished. "That's a damn good paper, John" offered
Langley Associate Director Charles Donlan. "But throw
out all that nonsense on lunar-orbit rendezvous?' Houbolt
remembers that Max Faget and several other members of
the STG offered the same advice. 88
This was "strike three." The Lundin Committee had been
"strike one" against Houbolt--LOR was completely
rejected. The Heaton Committee had been "strike two"---
LOR would not even be considered. Houbolt's rehearsal
talk was, in a sense, the "third strike." But at least all
three had been "swinging strikes" so to speak. Houbolt
had used each occasion to promote LOR, and he had
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given his best effort each time. Furthermore, he was to
have a few more times "at bat." The "inning" was over
but not the entire "ballgame."
The next "inning" in fact came quickly, in August 1961,
when Houbolt met with the so-called Golovin
Committee--yet another of Bob Seamans' ad hoc task
forces. Established on 7 July 1961, this joint Large Launch
Vehicle Planning Group---co-chaired by Nicholas E.
Golovin, Seamans' special technical assistant, and
Lawrence L. Kavanau of the Department of Defense--
was supposed to recommend not only a booster rocket for
Project Apollo but also other launch vehicle configurations
that would meet the anticipated needs of NASA and the
Defense Department. _
The committee was to concern itself only with large
launch vehicle systems, so nothing necessitated an
inquiry into the LOR scheme. However, three members
of the NASA headquarters staff working with this
group---Eldon W. Hall, Harvey Hall, and Milton W.
Rosen, all of the Office of Launch Vehicle Programs--
asked that the LOR concept be presented for their con-
sideration of a mission plan. 9°This was to be done as part
of a systematic comparative evaluation of three types of
rendezvous operations (Earth orbit, lunar orbit, and lunar
surface) and direct ascent for a piloted lunar landing. The
Golovin Committee assigned the study of Earth-orbit
rendezvous to the Marshall Space Flight Center,
lunar-surface rendezvous to the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, and LOR to Langley. The NASA Office of
Launch Vehicle Programs would provide the information
on direct ascent. 9_
This commitment to a comparative evaluation of the
mission modes, including LOR, constituted a critical
turning point in the history of the tortuous intellectual
and bureaucratic process by which NASA eventually
decided on a mission mode for Project Apollo. This is not
to say that the Goiovin Committee would conclude in
favor of LOR, because it would not. Its final, somewhat
vacillating recommendation, made in mid-October after
all the field centers had delivered their reports, was in
favor of a hybrid rendezvous scheme that combined
aspects of both Earth-orbit rendezvous and LOR. The
committee's preference was clearly for some form
of rendezvous. Lunar-surface rendezvous, the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory's deformed baby, had been ruled
out, and direct ascent was fading as a possibility. The
engineering calculations were showing clearly that any
single rocket that had to carry all the fuel necessary for
carrying out the entire lunar mission was just not a real-
istic option-----especially if the mission was to be accom-
plished anywhere close to President Kennedy's
timetable. The development of a rocket that mammoth
would take too long, and the expense would be
enormous.
For Houbolt and the other LOR advocates, then, the work
of the Golovin Committee meant the first meaningful
opportunity to demonstrate the merits of LOR in a
full-blown comparison with the other viable options. It
was the kind of opportunity for which Houbolt had been
asking in all of his previously unsuccessful briefings.
When he appeared before the committee in August 1961,
"they were damn impressed." They asked him, to his
delight, whether the STG knew about it. Golovin turned
to Aleck C. Bond, the STG's representative on the com-
mittee, and asked him to return to Langley and "check
with your fellows on what they're doing about this." A
few days later, Houbolt was again in front of the STG
talking to them in a well-received presentation about the
same thing that they had told him not to talk about just
the month earlier? 2
With the Shepard and Grissom flights accomplished and
the Golovin Committee now urging them to study ren-
dezvous, the STG members started to come around. Thus
far, as other historians have noted, the STG had "seen lit-
tle merit in any form of rendezvous for lunar missions"
and had reserved "its greatest disdain for the lunar orbit
version. ''9_ Now at least some of its engineers were show-
ing solid interest. In early September 1961, Jim
Chamberlin, the STG recruit from Canada who asked for
Houbolt's circular and other supporting material after
hearing the proposals for MORAD and MALLIR five
months earlier, talked to Gilruth about an LOR plan for
a lunar landing program--and for a preparatory three-
flight rendezvous experiment that sounded much like
the ideas Houbolt had been pushing. This was most
significant. Never before had a member of the STG
seriously offered any flight plan for a lunar landing
involving any sort of rendezvous in lunar orbit. Although
Gilruth was not convinced of the merits of such a
scheme, he was open to further evaluation?'
Chamberlin's notion derived in part from the STG's
August 1961 proposal for an accelerated circumlunar
program; this proposal appeared as an appendix to its
"Preliminary Project Development Plan for an Advanced
Manned Space Program Utilizing the Mark II Two-Man
Spacecraft." In essence, the larger document called for
the start of what became known as Project Gemini, the
series of two-astronaut rendezvous and docking missions
in Earth's orbit that NASA successfully carried out
between March 1965 and November 1966. 9sBut the seed
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for Project Gemini, as planted by Chamberlin at least,
must also have some important connection to Houbolt's
April 1961 MORAD (Manned Orbital Rendezvous and
Docking) proposal. _
A Voice in the Wilderness
During the late summer and early fall of 1961, Houbolt
was busy preparing the formal report that the Golovin
Committee had requested. Except for his "admiral's
page," much of the analysis in favor of LOR was still
in a loose form. So along with John Bird, Art Vogeley,
Max Kurbjun, and the other rendezvous people at
Langley, he set out to document their research findings
and demonstrate what a complete lunar landing mission
using LOR would entail. The fruit of this labor was
an impressive two-volume report titled, "Manned
Lunar-Landing through Use of Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous?'
Published by NASA Langley on 31 October 1961, this
report promoted what its principal author, John C.
Houbolt, called a "particularly appealing scheme" for
performing the president's lunar landing mission. 97
One might have thought that this extremely thorough
document would have been enough, even for a zealous
crusader like Houbolt, but it was not. The Heaton
Committee had submitted its final report in August
1961--a report with which Houboit, an official member
of that committee, fervently disagreed. Some "arbitrary
ground rules" had kept Houbolt from talking about LOR,
and, when he protested, Heaton had told him to write his
own minority report. If Heaton imagined he would not do
it, he was wrong.
On 15 November 1961, Houbolt fired off a nine-page
letter to Seamans with two different editions of his
LOR "admiral's sheet" attached to it. The Langley
engineer feared that the letter might cost him his job.
He was skipping proper channels, a bold move for a
government employee, in appealing directly to the
associate administrator, NASA's number-two official.
"Somewhat as a voice in the wilderness," Houbolt's
letter opened, "I would like to pass on a few thoughts
that have been of deep concern to me over recent
months." He then framed his concerns in terms of
questions: "Do we want to go to the moon or not?,
and, if so, why do we have to restrict our thinking to a
certain narrow channel?" He also asked: "Why is
Nova, with its ponderous size simply just accepted,
and why is a much less grandiose scheme involving
rendezvous ostracized or put on the defensive? .... I
fully realize that contacting you in this manner is
somewhat unorthodox," Houbolt admitted, "but the
issues at stake are crucial enough to us all that an
unusual course is warranted. ''98
Houbolt's biggest complaint was against the bureaucratic
guidelines that had made it impossible for the Heaton
Committee to consider the merits of LOR. "This is to me
nonsense;' he stated frankly. "I feel very fortunate that I do
not have to confine my thinking to arbitrarily set up
ground rules which only serve to constrain and preclude
possible equally good or perhaps better approaches." Too
often, he declared, NASA has been narrowly circumscrib-
ing its thinking:
[G]round rules are set up, and then the question is
tacitly asked, "Now, with these ground rules what does
it take, or what is necessary to do the job?" A design
begins and shortly it is realized that a booster system
way beyond present plans is necessary. Then a scare
factor is thrown in; the proponents of the plan suddenly
become afraid of the growth problems or that perhaps
they haven't computed so well, and so they make the
system even larger as an "insurance" that no matter
what happens the booster will be large enough to meet
the contingency.
Somehow, Houbolt warned, "the fact is completely
ignored that they are dealing with a ponderous develop-
ment that goes far beyond the state of the art? '_
In condemning the drive for huge and tremendously
expensive new boosters and instead advertising the effi-
cacy of a lunar mission involving LOR and more modest
boosters, Houbolt did worry about the impression he
might be making. He and Seamans had had "only occa-
sional and limited contact" and really did not know each
other that well. Houbolt realized that Seamans may feel
that he was "dealing with a crank?' "Do not be afraid of
this:' Houbolt pleaded. "The thoughts expressed here
may not be stated in as diplomatic a fashion as they
might be, or as I would normally try to do, but this is by
choice?' The most important thing was that Seamans
heard his heartfelt ideas directly and "not after they have
filtered through a score or more of other people, with the
attendant risk they may not even reach you. ''_°°
It took two weeks for Seamans to reply to Houbolt's
extraordinary letter. Seamans agreed that "it would be
extremely harmful to our organization and to the country
if our qualified staff were unduly limited by restrictive
guidelines." He assured Houbolt that in the future NASA
would be paying more attention to LOR than it had
until then? °_
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Seamans also informed him that he had passed on his long
letter with its attachments to D. Brainerd Holmes, who had
just replaced Abe Silverstein as head of the Office of
Manned Space Flight (recently renamed Space Flight
Programs). Unlike Seamans, who apparently was not
bothered by the letter being sent outside formal organiza-
tional channels, Holmes "didn't like it at all" and said so
when he in turn passed the letter to George Low, his
Director of Spacecraft and Flight Missions. Low was more
forgiving. Although he conceded that it might have been
better for Houbolt to have followed standard procedures,
he found the basic message "relatively sound." He, too,
felt that "the bug approach" may yet prove to be
"the best way of getting to the moon" and that NASA
needed to give it as much attention as any other alternative.
At the end of the memo to Holmes in which he passed on
these feelings, Low recommended that Houbolt be invited
to Washington to present in detail Langley's plan for a
manned lunar landing via LOR. Low also suggested that
Houbolt be a member of Holmes's staff. 1°2
That never happened, but another person who did join
Holmes's staff at this point, Dr. Joseph E Shea, eventu-
ally played a major role in supporting Houbolt's ideas
and making the future decision in favor of LOR. A
35-year-old Ph.D. in electrical engineering, Shea arrived
at NASA during the first week of January 1962 and
became Holmes's deputy director for spaceflight sys-
tems. From 1956 to 1959, this energetic engineer from
the Bronx had served as the systems engineer at Bell
Laboratories for a radio guidance project involving the
Titan I rocket. In 1959 he moved to General Motors,
where he ran the advanced development operation for its
A.C. Sparkplug Division. His major achievement in this
job was winning a contract for developing an inertial
guidance system for the Titan I1.1°3
At NASA, Joe Shea found himself thrust into helping
sort out the best means of accomplishing the lunar land-
ing mission. During one of the first days in his office,
Brainerd Holmes came to see him, with his copy of
Houbolt's letter in hand. Shea perused the long letter and
followed Holmes to Seamans's office. Seamans asked
him whether he thought there was anything to Houbolt's
message. After an unsure response, Seamans advised the
young systems engineer that NASA really did not know
how it was going to the Moon. Shea answered tactfully,
"I was beginning to get the same suspicion "''°'
"Shea didn't know much about what was going on,"
Houbolt remembers, but quickly he became informed
within days of the meeting with Seamans and Holmes
about the Houbolt letter. Shea was at Langley for a pri-
vate conversation with Houbolt and for a general briefing
attended by Langley management and the leadership of
the STG. Going into the meeting, if Shea had a prefer-
ence for any one lunar mission mode, it was a weak one
for Earth-orbit rendezvous. But, especially after reading
Houbolt's letter to Seamans and knowing that Seamans
was sympathetic to it, Shea was not against the other
options. Shea was an open-minded man who "prided
himself on going wherever the data took him. ''°S
And the data led him toward LOR. When Houbolt fin-
ished his much-practiced pitch, the receptive Shea admit-
ted that the analysis looked "pretty good." He then turned
to Gilruth, Faget, and other members of the STG and
asked them politely whether they, too, had been thinking
along the lines of LOR. Having heard about the general
skepticism toward Houbolt's ideas, Shea expected a neg-
ative reaction, but he did not get it. Instead, the STG
leaders responded in a mildly positive way that signified
to Shea, as the discussion continued, that "actually, they
had been doing some more thinking about lunar-orbit
rendezvous and, as a matter of fact, they were beginning
to think it was a good idea. ''_
Shea returned to Washington convinced that LOR was a
viable option for Apollo and that the next step for NASA
was to award a contract for an even more detailed study
of its potential. On 1 March 1962, eight days after astro-
naut John Glenn's historic three-orbit flight in Mercury
spacecraft Friendship 7, NASA awarded Tom Dolan's
Chance-Vought Corporation, the firm that had been one
of the original proponents of the LOR concept, the con-
tract to study spacecraft rendezvous._°7 At Langley on 29
March, a group of researchers led by Houbolt briefed a
Chance-Vought team on the center's LOR research and
mission plan. t°_On 2 and 3 April, Shea presented LOR as
a possible mission mode for Apollo in a headquarters
meeting that was attended by representatives of all the
NASA centers) °9
The final decision to select LOR for Apollo was in
the making.
The LOR Decision
In the months following Houbolt's second letter to
Seamans, NASA gave LOR the serious consideration for
which Houbolt had been crusading. To the surprise of
many inside and outside the agency, the darkhorse candi-
date became the front-runner. Several factors worked in its
favor. First, there was growing disenchantment with the
idea of direct ascent because of the time and money nec-
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essary to develop the huge Nova rocket. Second, there was
increasing technical apprehension over how the relatively
large spacecraft demanded by Earth-orbit rendezvous
would be able to maneuver to a soft and pinpoint landing
on the Moon. As Langley's expert on the dynamics of ren-
dezvous, Art Vogeley, explained, 'q'he business of eye-
bailing that thing down to the Moon really didn't have a
satisfactory answer. The best thing about LOR was that it
allowed us to build a separate vehicle for landing TM
The first major group to favor LOR was Bob Gilruth's
STG. During the critical months of the Apollo mission
mode debate, this group was harried not only with plan-
ning for the first Mercury orbital flight but also with
packing and leaving for its new home in Houston. Once
the STG's engineers started closely examining the prob-
lems of landing a spacecraft on the Moon and had the
analysis confirmed by industry, they, too, saw the wis-
dom of the staged approach built into LOR. It possessed
a certain elegance of economy that was absent in the
other schemes.
During an interview in the late 1980s, Houston's Max
Faget recalled the details of how the Manned Spacecraft
Center finally became convinced that LOR was the fight
choice. By early 1962, "we found ourselves sealing into a
program that was not easy to run, because so many differ-
ent groups were involved. In particular, we were con-
cerned about the big landing rocket, because landing on
the Moon would, of course, be the most delicate part of the
mission. The landing rocket's engine, which would be
controlled by the astronauts, would have to be throttleable,
so that the command-and-service module could hover, and
move this way and that, to find a proper place to touch
down. That meant a really intimate interface, requiring
numerous connections, between the two elements" as well
as between Houston and the Lewis Research Center.
"Accordingly, we invented a new proposal for our own and
von Braun's approach. It involved a simpler descent
engine, called the lunar crasher, which Lewis would do. It
wouldn't be throttleable, so the interface would be simpler,
and it would take the astronauts down to a thousand feet
above the lunar surface. There it would be jettisoned, and
it would crash onto the moon. Then there would be a
smaller, throttleable landing stage for the last thousand
feet, which we would do, so that we would be in charge of
both sides of that particular interface."
But at that point, Faget and his colleagues in Texas
"ran into a real wall" Initially, their thinking had been that
the landing would be done automatically with radar and
instrument control. But the astronauts, along with a growing
number of NASA engineers (primarily at Langley), began
to argue that the astronaut-pilots were going to need com-
plete control during the last phases of landing and therefore
required a wide range of visibility out of the descending
spacecraft. How to provide that visibility "with a landing
rocket big enough to get the command-and-service module
down to the lunar surface and wide enough to keep it
upright" was the problem that Houston began tackling in
early 1962, and they found out quickly that they could not
solve it. '%Ve toyed with various concepts," Faget remem-
bers, such as putting a front-viewing porch on the outside or
a glass bubble on top of the command module similar to the
cockpit of a helicopter. But all of the redesigns had serious
flaws. For example, "the porch would have to be jettisoned
before lift-off from the moon, because it would unbalance
the spacecraft." "It was a mess:' Faget admitted. "No one
had a winning idea. Lunar-orbit rendezvous was the only
sensible alternative TM
Houbolt's role in the STG's eventual "conversion" to LOR
cannot be described without upsetting someone---or at
least questioning the correctness of some key player's
memory. Faget, Gilruth, and others associated with the
Manned Spacecraft Center believe that Houbolt's activi-
ties were "useful:' but hardly as vital as many others,
notably Houbolt himself, believe. "John Houbolt just
assumed that he had to go to the very top" Gilruth has
explained, but "he never talked to me:' It is Gilruth's belief
that LOR "would have been chosen without Houbolt's
somewhat frantic efforts" The "real work of convincing
the officials in Washington and Huntsville" he says, was
done "by the spacecraft group in Houston during the six or
eight months following President Kennedy's decision to
fly to the moon." In other words, they were the ones who
sold it, first to Huntsville and then, together with yon
Braun, to NASA headquarters. Houbolt's out-of-channels
letter to Seamans was thus irrelevanL m
Houbolt believes that the STG's version is self-serving
"baloney." He talked to Gilruth or his people many times;
they never told him that they were on his side. If Gilruth
or some other influential officer in the leadership of the
space program had just once said to him, "You can stop
fighting. We are now on your side; and we'll take it from
here:' then, Houbolt says, he would have been satisfied.
But they never said anything like that, and they certainly
did not "during the six or eight months" after Kennedy's
speech. In fact, their words always suggested the oppo-
site. It was not until early 1962, as seen in the prodding
from Joseph Shea, that the STG gave any indication that
it, too, was interested in LORY 3
Significantly, the outsiders or third parties to the question
of Houboit's role in ultimately influencing the STG's posi-
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tion tend to side with Houbolt. Bob Seamans remembers
nothing about the STG showing anything but disdain for
LOR during 1961. TM Nor did George Low. To the best of
his recollection, "it was Houbolt's letter to Seamans that
brought the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode back into the
picture." It was only after the letter that a group within the
STG, under Owen Maynard, began to study LOR.
According to Low, "the decision was finally made" about
the lunar-landing mission mode "based on Houbolt's
input" and on the results of the systems engineering stud-
ies carried out at the behest of Shea's Office of Manned
Space Flight Systems. "Without a doubt," in Low's view,
the letter Houbolt sent to Seamans in November 1961 and
the discussions at headquarters that it provoked "were the
start of bringing LOR into Apollo.'"'2
One final piece of testimony from an informed third party
supports the importance of Houbolt's role in
convincing the STG of the benefits of LOR. Starting in late
1961, NACA veteran Axel Mattson served as Langley's
technical liaison officer at the Manned Spacecraft Center.
Mattson maintained a small office at the Houston facility
for the timely transmittal of technical information between
Langley and Gilruth's recently removed STG. It was not a
high-profile, management-level operation at all, nor was it
supposed to be. According to the agreement between
Gilruth and Langley Director Floyd Thompson, Mattson
was to spend most of his time with the engineers in the field
who were working on the problems. "_
In early 1962, sometime after the Shea briefing at
Langley, Floyd Thompson sent Houbolt to Houston. The
purpose of his visit was, in Mattson's words, "to get the
STG people really to agree that [LOR] was the best way
to go and to support it." Mattson brought Houbolt to
almost everyone with some interest in the mission mode
issue. Houbolt told them about LOR and answered all
their questions. At the end of the day, Mattson felt that "it
was all over. We had the support of the Manned
Spacecraft Center" for LOR.'"
Symbolically, on 6 February 1962, Houbolt and former
Langley engineer Charles W. Matthews, now of the
Manned Spacecraft Center, gave a joint presentation on
rendezvous to the Manned Space Flight Management
Council, a special body formed by Brainerd Holmes in
December 1961---4o identify and resolve difficulties in the
manned spaceflight program on a month-to-month basis.
The two engineers compared the merits of LOR and Earth-
orbit rendezvous, concluding in favor of LOR. It is worth
noting that Gilruth telephoned Houbolt personally to ask
him to give this talk. According to Houbolt, it was "the first
concession" that Gilruth had ever made regarding LOR. "8
As luck would have it, the call from Gilruth came on a
Friday, the day before Houbolt and his family were to leave
for a ski trip to Stowe, Vermont. Gilruth asked him if he
could be in Washington on Monday to give the talk, and
Houbolt--remembering how he had to make reservations
at the resort three months in advance--reluctantly agreed.
On Saturday he flew with his wife and children to Albany,
New York, rented a car, and drove to the ski resort. He
stayed the night, drove back to the airport in the morning,
boarded an airplane, and was in Washington in time for the
Monday morning meeting.
With the STG now firmly behind LOR, it boiled down to a
contest between the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston
and the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville.
Marshall was still a bastion for those who supported
Earth-orbit rendezvous. Von Braun's people recognized
two things. First, Earth-orbit rendezvous would require the
development of advanced versions of Marshall's own
Satum booster. Second, the selection of Earth-orbit ren-
dezvous for the lunar landing program would require the
construction of a platform in Earth orbit that could have
many other uses than for Apollo, scientific and otherwise.
For this reason, space station advocates--and there were
many at the Alabama facility--were enthusiastic about
Earth-orbit rendezvous. N9 To them, this mode of ren-
dezvous would offer the best long-term results.
But von Braun, their own director, would disappoint
them. During the spring of 1962, the transplanted
German rocket designer made the altruistic decision--
despite the wishes of most of his people--to support
LOR. He surprised them with this shocking announce-
ment at the end of a day-long briefing presented to Joe
Shea at Marshall on 7 June 1962:
We at the Marshall Space Flight Center readily admit
that when first exposed to the proposal of the Lunar
Orbit Rendezvous Mode we were a bit skeptical-par-
ticularly of the aspect of having the astronauts execute a
complicated rendezvous maneuver at a distance of
240,000 miles from the earth where any rescue possibil-
ity appeared remote. In the meantime, however, we have
spent a great deal of time and effort studying the four
modes [Earth-orbit rendezvous, LOR, and two Direct
Ascent modes, one involving the Nova and the other a
Saturn C-5], and we have come to the conclusion that
this particular disadvantage is far outweighed by [its]
advantages ....
We understand that the Manned Spacecraft Center was
also quite skeptical at first when John Houbolt advanced
the proposal of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode, and
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(Counterclockwise from twelve o'clock) Wernher yon Braun meets with Robert Gilruth and other high NASA officials, George Mueller
and Kurt Debus, sometime in the mid-1960s. The chart on the wall is a diagram of the Apollo 8 mission.
that it took them quite a while to substantiate the
feasibility of the method and finaUy endorse is
Against this background it can, therefore, be concluded
that the issue of "invented here" versus "not invented
here" does not apply to either the Manned Spacecra_
Center or the Marshall Space Flight Center; that both
Centers have actually embraced a scheme suggested
by a third source .... 1 consider it fortunate indeed
for the Manned Lunar Landing Program that both
Centers, after much soul searching, have come to
identical conclusions.
The persuasive von Braun then proceeded into a long
elaboration on "why we do not recommend" the direct
ascent and Earth-orbit rendezvous modes and "why we
do recommend the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Mode. '''2°
For Marshall employees and many other people inside
NASA, von Braun's announcement seemed to represent a
type of closure--that is, the culmination of a sociopolitical
process that occurs in technology typically "when a con-
sensus emerges that a problem arising during the develop-
ment of a technology has been solved" In this case, it was
a very undemocratic form of closure, coming from von
Braun himself, with little support from his own engi-
neers. 1_'For closure to occur and LOR to become the mis-
sion mode for Apollo, it did not take any referendum or
consensus; it simply took a decision made and stuck
to in the face of any later opposition. Although some
questions about his motives still need to be answered, one
apparent factor above all seems to explain his shift in
sentiment. Von Braun understood that it was absolutely
necessary, if NASA were to meet President Kennedy's
deadline, to proceed with the program---and no movement
was possible until the decision about the mission mode was
made. Both the Manned Spacecraft Center and Langley's
John Houbolt had worked on von Braun to convert him to
their side. In April 1962, Houboit sent him several of the
papers prepared at Langley on a lunar landing mission
using LOR, including the published two-volume report.
Von Braun had requested the papers personally after hear-
ing a presentation by Houbolt at NASA Headquarters.
Then von Braun sent copies of the Langley papers to
Hermann Koelle, in Marshall's Future Projects Office. And
after he made his unexpected announcement in favor of
LOR to the stunned crowd of Marshall employees in early
June, yon Braun reciprocated by sending Houbolt a per-
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sonal copy of his remarks. This was a noteworthy personal
courtesy by von Braun to the Langley engineer. In fact, the
final sentence of the cover letter asked Houbolt to "please
treat this confidentially (in other words, keep it to yourself),
since no final decision on the mode has yet been made. ''_2-'
The LOR decision was finalized in the following weeks,
when the two powerful groups of converts at Houston and
Huntsville, along with the original band of believers at
Langley, persuaded key officials at NASA headquarters,
notably Administrator James Webb, who had been holding
out for direct ascent, that LOR was the only way to land on
the Moon by 1969. With the key players lined up behind
the concept, the NASA Manned Space Flight Management
Council announced that it favored LOR on 22 June 1962.
On 11 July, the agency announced that it had selected that
mode for Apollo. Webb made the announcement, even
though President Kennedy's science adviser, Dr. Jerome
Wiesner, remained firmly opposed to LOR. '23
On the day that NASA made the public announcement,
John Houbolt was presenting a paper on the dynamic
response of airplanes to atmospheric turbulence at a meet-
ing of NATO's Advisory Group for Aerospace Research
and Development (AGARD) in Paris. 12'His division chief,
Isadore E. ("Ed") Garrick, also was at the meeting. A
talented applied mathematician who had been working at
Langley since the 1930s (and who had assisted NACA's
great flutter theorist Theodore Theodorsen), Garrick had
witnessed the evolution of his assistant's ideas on space
navigation and rendezvous. He had listened sympathetical-
ly to all of Houbolt's stories about the terrible things that
had been blocking a fair hearing for LOR.
While at the AGARD meeting in Paris, Garrick noticed a
little blurb in the overseas edition of the New York Herald
Tribune about NASA's decision to proceed with LOR.
Garrick showed the paper to Houbolt, who had not seen
it, shook Houbolt's hand, and said, "Congratulations,
John. They've adopted your scheme. I can safely say I'm
shaking hands with the man who single-handedly saved
the government $20 billion "''25
In the ensuing years, whenever the question of Houbolt's
importance for the LOR decision was discussed, Garrick
made it clear that he was "practically certain that without
John Houbolt's persistence it would have taken several
more years for LOR to have been adopted,' Although
"the decisions of many other people were essential to the
process" and although "there is no controversy that
Houbolt had help from others .... the essential prime
mover, moving 'heaven and earth' to get the concepts
across, remains Houbolt himself. ''12_
Conclusion
Whether NASA's choice of the LOR concept would have
been made in the summer of 1962 or at any other later
time without the research information, commitment, and
crusading zeal of Houbolt remains a matter for historical
conjecture. His basic contribution, however, and that of
his associates who in their more quiet ways also devel-
oped and advocated LOR, seems now to be beyond
debate. They were the first in NASA to recognize the
fundamental advantages of the LOR concept, and for a
critical period in the early 1960s, they also were the only
ones inside the agency to foster it and fight for it. The
story of the genesis of the LOR concept thus testifies
to the essential importance of the single individual con-
tribution even within the context of a large organization
based on teamwork. It also underscores the occasionally
vital role played by the unpopular and minority opinion.
Sometimes one person alone or a small group of persons
may have the best answer to a problem. And those who
believe passionately in their ideas must not quit, even
in the face of the strongest opposition or pressures
for conformity.
Thousands of factors contributed to the ultimate success of
the Apollo lunar landing missions, but no single factor was
more essential than the concept of LOR. Without NASA's
adoption of this stubbornly held minority opinion in 1962,
the United States may still have reached the Moon, but
almost certainly it would not have been accomplished by
the end of the 1960s, President Kennedy's target date.
One can take this "what-if" scenario even further. Without
LOR, it is possible that no one even now--near the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century--would have landed on the
Moon. No other way but LOR could solve the landing
Houbolt won a special award from NASA in 1963for his work on LOR.
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problems. No less of an authority than George Low has
expressed this same judgment. "It is my opinion to this
day" Low wrote in 1982, "that had the Lunar Orbit
Rendezvous Mode not been chosen, Apollo would not have
succeeded" All of the other modes "would have been so
complex technically, that there would have been major set-
backs in the program, and it probably would have failed
along the way." Low also believed that without "John
Houbolt's persistence in calling this method to the attention
of NASA's decision makers" and "without Houbolt's letter
to Seamans (and the work that backed up that letter)"
NASA "might not have chosen the Lunar Orbit
Rendezvous Mode." Houbolt's commitment was a key fac-
tor in the adoption of LOR and was "a major contribution
to the success of Apollo and, therefore, to the Nation. '''_
At 4:17 p.m. (eastem daylight time) on 20 July 1969, John
Houbolt, by then a senior consultant with the innovative
Aeronautical Research Associates of Princeton, New
Jersey, sat inconspicuously as one of the "nest" of invited
guests and dignitaries in the viewing room of Mission
Control at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston. Like
so many others around the world at that moment, he
listened in wonder to the deliberately spoken, yet wildly
dramatic words of Apollo 11 astronaut Neil Armstrong:
"Houston, Tranquility Base here. The Eagle has landed:'
If one ever needed some final confirmation of the impor-
tance of Houbolt's role in the selection of LOR as the mis-
sion mode for Apollo, it would come here, during the
alternate cheering and shushing of that precious moment,
when Americans landed and stepped on the Moon for the
first time. Turning from his seat, NASA's master rocketeer,
Wemher yon Braun, found Houbolt's eye among all the
others, gave him the okay sign, and said to him simply,
"John, it worked beautifully."
Houbolt was speechless at what would be the greatest
moment in his professional life--not to mention one
of the greatest moments in the life of the entire human
community. But the crusader was thinking: "By golly,
the world ought to stop fight at this moment. ''m The
righteousness of his cause had been justified.
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National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Langley Research Center
Langley Field, Virginia
my
__'°.
Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Associate Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
1520 H St., N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Dr. Seamans:
This will be a hurried non-edited and limited note to pass on a few
remarks about rendezvous and large launch vehicles.
First_ let me co-___ent on the staff paper on rendezvous •that was
recently comp2_eted by Mr. Bernard Maggin. Bernie has done a fine job
here and is to be commended. I share and back the'viewpoints expressed
almos_ c_mpletely. The main item no_" "covered is the outlining of a
specific s_nd firm program on rendezvous, but this of co,_rse could not
be covered without agreement throughout NASA. We have some definite
ideas on what the program should be, s_nd these will be forwarded as soon
as some reproduction problems of the material are overcome.
With respect to launch vehicles, let me forthrightedly state that
the situation is deplorable :
a. To be structurally sound the Saturn should undergo major
structural modifications.
b. The S-IV is having serious setbacks _'hich make it very
doubt_althat any time schedule involving S-IV can be met, and
further there is no back-up to this S-IV stage in case it fails
completely.
c. H2, 02 engines are not progressing nor developing as
was so gloriously promised.
d. The F-I engine is far from being developed.
e. There is no committed booster plan beyond Saturn C-l.
f. And even the existing but payload-llmited latuuch vehicles,
such as Atlas and Titan, which have had years of development and
on which trememdous funds have been spent, are operationally poor.
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In brief, our booster position is pathetic,_but what is even worse,
we have no Jobs going on or even direct plans to remedythe situation.
_'nat should be done? It would appear that any consideration should
include the following _
_.z .
1. Give serious deliberation as to whether S-IV should have
a back-up (whether propellant is RP, storable_ or _$olI_).
2. Firm up realistic and practical boosters that go beyond
Saturn C-1 capabilities.
3. Establish parallel large booster programs involving solid
rockets. _ne potentialities of large solids have been overlooked
too long, and it may very well be that they cando Saturn Jobs and
beyond in a relatively easy manner.
in connection with these three items, let me also make this observa-
tion which I'm sure would sound naive to many. It would come as no
surprise to me that we would now have a pretty good large booster if we
had concentrated effort on the development of a very simple and reliable
small booster, and that all we had to do to obtain various iarger
boosters was to "snap" these smaller boosters together in various arrange-
ments', w_th ao interconnections save mecessary structural coupling members.
No_,_, let me _-evert back to rendezvous• I do not wish to argue which
way, the "direct way" or the "rendezvous _ay", is the best. But because
of the lag in launch vehicle developments, it would appear that the only
way that will be available to us in the next few years is the rendezvous
_,_ay. For this very reason I feel it m_ndatory that rendezvous be as much
in future plans as any item, and that it be attacked vigorously. I would
like, however, to make a few c_ents in connection _ith large booster
desirability. For example, the argument is presented too freely and per-
haps erroneously that the cost per pound in orbit is less through use of
one big booster than by other means. Not enougja attention is given to
reliability and to probability of mission success. If the costs based on
equal probability of mission success are compared, it may very well be
that the cost per pound is larger by the big booster scheme. Charts of
the type shown in the attached figure should be kept in mind. In this
fi_are the probability of a mission success is plotted against number of
mission attempts, for different probabilities of success for an individual
attempt. Suppose that the probability of success of a big booster attempt
is 0.4., and this low value may not be unrealistic (consider the Saturn S-I
engines: I understand the probability of each engine functioning is 0.96;
thus, the probability of all 8 engines operating is 0•72. This value pertaJ
to engine only; the other components may add another factor of 0.72 bring-
in_ the probability down around 0.5. Now suppose, in addition, 6 - 8 - lO
or more engines had to be ignited aloft. Surely, if_it is difficult to
get 8 engines going on the ground, it is even more difficult while in fligh_
.:-...
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Thus the 0.5 may even be cut in half, giving a fairly lo_ overall proba-
bility.) After this long side comment, let's get back to the 0.4 value.
If 2 attempts at _this individual probability level are involved, then
the attached figure shows a 0.64 probability for mission success. In
contrast, now suppose another but slightly more costly mission scheme were
used which had an individual probability of 0.64. Then only one attempt
is necessary to accomplish the mission with the same probability of over-
all success as compared _ith two attempts for the previous case. The net
cost is thus smaller for the more costly scheme.
Additional factors which enter into big booster considerations
include (1) are facilities available to construct them? (2) can they
be moved about and transported? and (3) are launch sites practical and
_,_.ere _ll they be located? Although not specifically stated, one of the
ideas I'm trying to bring out is that perhaps there is too much pla__uing
of _rojects that simply assume the existence of the t_oe of booster
needed, without asking honestly whether it really will be there, and at
the right time.
!'!! close now. Perhaps these thoug_hts may be of some use to you.
Sincerely yours,
Encl.
John C. Houbolt
Associate Chief
Dynamic Loads Division
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June 2, 1961
_. John C. Houbolt
Associate Chief
Dynamic Loaas Division
Langley Research Center
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
LanHle _ Field, Virginia
Dear John:
Thank you for your co_Inents in your letter of Hay 19,
1961. As you probably know, the problems that concern you
are of concern to the whole agency and we have some intensive
study programs under way at the present time that will provide
us a base for decisions.
You also probably know by this time that the recent
Presidential recommendations for increases in the space
program budget included funding for the Air Force to
accelerate a large solid motor development program and an
increase in the NASA budget to accelerate the rendezvous
docking program.
Sincerely,
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Associate Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Langley Research Center
Langley Air Force Base, Va.
November 15, _9_I --r---' _
Dr. Robert C. Seammns, Jr.
Associate Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
1520 K Streetj N.W.
k:ashington 25, D. C.
Dear Dr . Seame-ns :
Somewhat as a voice in the _iderness_ I would like to bass on a
fe_.:thoughts on matters that have been of deep concern to me over recent
months. _This * concern may be phrased ia terms of two questions: (1) If
you w@re_old that we can put men on't_e moon with safe return with a
single C-3, its equivalent or something less, would you judge this state-
nant with the critical skepticism that others have? (2) Is the establish-
ment of a sound booster program really so difficult?
I would like to con_nent on both these questions, and more, would
like to forward as attachments condensed versions of plans which embody
ideas and suggestions which I believe are so -_und_mentally soured and
inportant that wecannot afford to overlook them. You will recall I
wrote to you on a previous occasion. I fully realize that contacting
you in this manner is some.ghat unorthodox; "_zut the issues at stake are
crucial enough to us all that an unusual course is warranted.
Since we have had only occasional and limited contact, and because
you therefore probably do not know me very well, it is conceivable that
ax_er reading this you may feel that you are dealing with a crank. Do
not be afraid of this. The thoughts expressed here may not be stated
in as diplomatic a fashion as they might be, or as I would normally try
to doj but this is by choice and at the moment is not important. The
important point is that you hear the ideas directly, not after they have
filtered through a score or more of other people, with the attendant risk
that they may not even reach you.
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Manned Lunar _Landing Through Use of Lunar_0rblt Rendezvous
The plan.- The first attachment outlines in brief the plan by which
we may accomplish a manned lunar landing through use of a lunar rendez-
vous, and shows a number of schemes for doing this by'menus of a single
C-3, its equivalent, or even something less. The basic ideas of the
pl__n were presented before various NASA people well over a year ago, aud
were since repeated at numerous interlaboratory meetings. A lunar landing
• _rogr_m utilizing rendezvous concepts was even suggested back In A_r$1.
Essentially, it had three basic points: (1) the establishment of an
early rendezvous program involving Mercury, (2) the specific inclusion of
rendezvous in Apollo developments, and (3) the accomplishment of lunar
landing through use of C-2's. It was indicated then thattwo C-2's could
do the job, C-2 being referred to simply because NASA booster plans did
not go beyond the C-2 at that time; it was mentioned, however, that with
a C-3 the number of boosters required would be cut in half, specifically
only one.
Regrettably, there was little interest shown in the idea - indeed, if
any, it was negative.
S_ A - o._i (for the record), the scheme was presented before the Lundin
Coramittee. It received only bare mention in the final report and was
not discussed further (see comments below in section entitled "Grandiose
Plans ").
It was presented before the Heaton Committee, accepted as a good idea,
then dropped, mainly on the irrelevant basis that it did not conform to
the ground tales. I even argued against presenting the main plan consid-
ered by the Heaton C_ittee, largely because it would only bring harm to
the rendezvous cause, and further argued that if the committee did not
want to ccnsider lunar rendezvous, at least they should make a strong
reco___mendation that it looks promising enough that it deserves a separate
treatment by itself - but to no avail. In fact, it was mentioned that if
I felt sufficiently strong about the matter, I should make a minority re-
port. This is essentially what I am doing.
We have given the plan to the presently meeting Golovin Committee
on several occasions. ._
In a rehearsal of a talk on'rendezvous for the recent Apollo Con-
ference, I gave a brief reference to the plan, indicating the benefit
derivable therefrom, Mnowing full well that the reviewing committee
woul_ ask me to withdraw any reference to this idea. As expected, this
was the only item I was asked to delete.
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__e pl_.n has been presented to the Space Task Group personnel several
ti_nes, dating back to more than a year ago. The interest expressed has
been c_pletely negative..
• .
.... i_ .....
Grou_ud rules.- The greatest objection that has beenraised about our
lunar rendezvous pls_ is that it does not conform to the "ground rules".
This to me is nonsense; the important question is, "Do we want to get to
the moon or nct?"_ _d, if so, why do we have to restrict our _hinking
alo_ig a certain n,_rrow channel. I feel very fcr%unate that I do not have
to confine my thinking to arbitrarily set up ground rules which only serve
to constrain and preclude possible equally good or perhaps better approaches.
Too cfzen thinking goes along the following vein: _gound rules are set up,
and then the question is tacitly asked, "Nov, with these grou_nd rules what
does i_ take• or what is necessary _o do the job?". A design begins s_nd
shortly it is realized that a booster system way beyond present plans is
necessary. Then a sca-_e factor is t_hro_m in; the proponents of the plan
su5denly become afraid of the gro_,_h problem or that perhaps they haven't
computed so well, and so they mak_e the system even larger as an "insurance"
that no matter _.rh__thappens the booster will be large enough to meet the
cc _._ .... cy. Somehow,', the fact i_ completely ignored that they are now
dealing with a _oonderous development that goes far beyond the state-of-
the-art_ _ - _
k[uy is there not more thinking along the following lines: Thus,
_.-lth this given booster, or this one, is there a_uything we can do to
do :he job? Ln other words• _,"nycan't _¢e also think alongthe lines of
deriving a plan to fi_ a booster• rather than derive a booster to fit
a plain ?
Three grou_ud rules in particular are worthy of mention: three men_
direct l_:. _ud storable return. These are very restrictive resuire-
hen, s. If t_._omen can do the job• e_ud if the use of only two men allows
the job to be done, then _uhy no_ do it this way? If relaxing the direct
requirements allows the job to be done with a C-3, then why not relax it?
F-_h_r, when a hard objective look is _aken at the use of storables,
then it is soon realized that perhaps they aren't so desirable or advan-
tageous after all in comparison with some other fuels.
Grs_ndiose p!_ns, one-sided objections, _nd bias.- For some inexplic-
able reason, everyone seems to want to avoid simple schenes. The major-
ity a!vays seems to be thinking in terms of gr_qdiose plans, giving all
sort of argents for long-range plans, etc. Why is there not more
thinking in the direction of developing the simplest scheme possible?
Figniratively, why not gob_y a Chevrolet instead of a Cadillac? Surely
a Chevrolet gets one from one place to s_uother just as well as a Cadillac,
e_nd in m_ny respects _ith marked advantages. -.:
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I have been appalled at the thinking of individuals and committees
on these matters. For ex_-_mple, comments of the following type have been
made: "Houbolt has a scheme that has a 50 percent chance of getting a
man to the moon, and a 1 percent chance of getting him ba_k." This com-
-ment was made by a Headquarter s individual at 'high level who never
really has taken the time to hear about the scheme, never'-'has had the
scheme explained to him fully, or possible even correctly, and yet he
feels free to pass Ju_ent on the work. I am bothered by stupidity of
this type being displayed by individuals who are in a position to make
decisions which affect not only the NASA, but the fate of the nation as
well. I have even groom to be concerned about the merits of all the c.x_-
mittees that have been considering the problem. Because of bias, the
intent of the committee is destroyed even before it starts andj _h_rther,
the cutcome is usually obvious from the beginning. We knew what the
Fleming Cczmittee results _._ould be before it started. After one day
it was clear _hat decisions the Tandin Committee would reach. After a
couple days it was obvious what the main decision of the Heaton Committee
would be. In connection __'th the Lundin Committee, I would like to cite
a specific exsmple. Considered by this co_ittee was one of the most
hair-brained ideas T _
.... v_ ever heard, and yet it received one first place
vo_e. in contrast, our lunar rendezvous scheme, which I am positive is a
much more worka_ole idea, received only bare mention in a negative vein,
as _..._as_er_ioned earlier. Thus, commit_es are no better than the bias
of the men composing them. We might then ask, why are men who are not
ccmpetent to judge ideas, allo;.:ed to judge them?
Ferhaps the substance of this section might be s'_ur_marized this way.
_Cny is NOVA, _ith its ponderous ideas, whether in size, manufacturing,
erection, site location, etc., simply just accepted, and why is a much
less grandiose sch_ne involving rendezvous ostracized or put on the
de fen sive?
P_-_RT chart folly.- I',_enone examines the various program schedules
that have been advanced, he carmot help from being impressed by the
optimism sho_m. The remarkable aspect is that the more remote the year,
the bolder the schedule becomes. This is, in large measure, due to the
P_--RT chart craze. It has beccme the vogue to subject practically every-
thing to a P_ chart __nalysis, _:hether it T'.e_s an>_hing or not. Those
who apply or make use of it seen to be overco:_e by a form cf self-hypnosis,
more or less acce_ting the _oint of view, "Zscause the -_RT chart says so,
it is so." Somehow, perhaps tunfortur._-Dely, .he year 1967 was mentioned
as the target year for putting a man on the iuoon. The Fleming report
throug_:_ extensive P_RT chart _ualysis then "proved" this could be done.
One cannot help but get the feeling that if the year 1966 had been
mentioned, then this would have been the date proven; likewise, if 1968
had been the year mentioned.
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._'yquarrel is not with the basic theory of P_W_KT chart analysis; I
am fully aware of its usefulness, _:hen properly applied. I have been
ncr.lnally in charge of a facility development and know the merits,
u__l__y, and succinctness by which it is helpful in keeping a going job
moving, uncovering bottlenecks, and so forth. But when it is used in
the nature of a crystal ball, then I begin to object. Thus, when we
scrutinize v_rious schedules s_ud programs, we have to be very careful
to ask how realistic the pl_u really is. _jten simple cc_uon sense
tellz us much more than all the zschinez in the world.
I make the above points because, as you %_ll see, _:e have a very
strong point to make about the possibility of coming up _rith a realistic
schedule; the plan _e offer is exceptionally cle_n and simple in vehicle
and booster requirements relative to other plans.
Booster is pacing item.- In wor_uing out a pa_er schedule we have
adopted the C-3 development schedule used by Fleming and Eeaton, not
necessarily because we feel the schedule is realistic, but simply to
make a comparison on a parallel basis. But ".:hether the date is right,
or no_, doesn_ matter. Here_ I just w_nt to point out tha_ for the
lu_nar rendezvous scheme the C-3 booster is the pacing item. Thus, we
c&n phr_e o_r itunar landing date this_way. We can put a man on the
moon _s "_oon as the C-3 is develepe_ "_nd the number of C-3's required
is very small. (In fact, as I mentioned earlier, I would not be sur-
prised to have the ple_n criticized on the basis that it is not grandiose
enough. )
Abort.- An item _fnich perhaps deserves special __ention is abort.
People have leveled criticism_ again erroneously and with no kqlowledge
of the situation, that the l_nar rendezvous scheme offers no abort
possibilities. Along _.__'thour m_ny technical studies ve have also
studied the abo__ problem quite thoroughly. We find that there is no
problem in executln_ at. aoo_ m_neuver at e_ny point in the mission.
Ln fact, a very s_riking result c_es out, just the reverse of the
izpressien many people try to create. _o,_en one comparesj for example,
the itunar rendezvous scheme __'th a direct approach, he finds that on
every count the lunar rendezvous method offers a degree of safety and
reliability far greater then that possible by the direct approach.
These items are touched upon to a l_ted ek_ent in the attached plan.
i
i
Booster Program
_.[yco,ants on a booster program _,_ll be relatively short, since
the second attae_,._ent more or less speaks for itself. There are, however_
a fe-_ points _-orthy of e_oellisbnnent. " _ --. _ .
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_coster design.- In the course of participating in meetings dealing
_:ith vehicle design, I have sometimes had to sit back completely awed
mud astonished at what I _as seeing take place. I have seen the course
of a_n entire meeting change because of an individual not connected %_ith
the meeting walking in, looping over shoulders, sh_.hi.s head in a
negative sense, and then walking out %_lthout uttering a word. I have
seen people agree on velocity increments, engine performance, and
-ztructural data, and after a booster desi@n was made to these figures,
have seen some of the people then aerate the vehicle simply because they
coul6.n't believe the numbers. I Just c_.--nnotcater to proceedings of this
t_._-oe. The situation is very much akin to a civil engineer who .hnows full
_o;ellthat the material he is using _rill withstand 60,000 psi. He then
applies a factor of safety of 2.5, makes a design, then after looking at
the resu!_ts, arbitrarily doubles the size of every member because he
isn't o_uite sure that the design is strong enough. A case in point is
the C-3. In my initial contacts with this vehicle, we _¢ere ass_ed that
it had a payload capability in the neighborhood of ll0,O00-120,O00 lbs.
Then it was derated. The value used by the Heaton Co-_ittee %.as
105,0CO lbs. By the time the vehicle had reached the Golovin C_ittee•
I _;as ar_azed to find that it had a capability of only 82_570 lbs. Per-
_:a__s the only cozment that can be made to this is that if _-e c2_n't do
any better o_ making elementary computations of this t_s_e, then we
desefVe'_o be in the pathetic situat_16_ ve are. I also wonder %-here
_.'e_,'ill stand after NOZrA is derated similarly.
_:___n,lzzng bad.- One of the reasons our booster situation is in
such a ._ad s_ate is the lack of appropriate engines, more s_l_ically
the lack of an orderly stepping in engine sizes. Booster progress is
virzually at a standstill because there are no engines available, Just
as engines were the major p__cing item in the developzent of aircraft.
.__side from the engines oh our smaller boosters• and the H-1 being used
on the C-l, the only engines _,,ehave in development are:
Capability Ratio
15,000
13.3
200,000
7.5
1,500 •000
T_he attempt to make boosters out of this stock of engines• having very
large ratios in capability, can only result in boosters of grotesque and
un,,.elay._-_" confi_ations, and _ich reouirem_ny,_ many in-flight engine
starts. _._at is needed are engines which step up in size at a lower
ratio. Consideration of the staging of an "ideal" rocket system indicates
that _hether accelerating to orbit speed or to escapespeed, the ratio of
engine sizes needed is in the order of 3. Logically then we ought to
have engines that step in capability by a factor of around 2, 3, or 4.
_ every-day analog that can be mentioned is outboard motors. There
is a motor to serve nearly every need, and in the extreme cases the
process of doubling up'is even used.
Booster 7_ _
._o.__m.- Lu light of the preceding paragraph, s_nd taking
into accc-_._ _he engines under development, we should add the •_c_±ow_n_": C
t_CO "
80,000 - 1003000
400,000- 500,000
_o__d then give a lir-e-up as follows:
H2 -02";
15,000 Wo
80,000 - 100,OO0 H/O _
200,000 H/0
400,000 - 500,000 E/O
1,5OO,0OO RP/O
_zi_h _he 15,O$O-ib. engine really not needed. __T_is array (plus those
-mentigne_ L_zbdlately below) would a!l_w the construction of almost all
_%_s-of_'_oos_ers conceivable. _or e_a_!e, a sing!eSO,O00-!O0,000
engii_e vcu!d t_:e _he _!ace of the six L-II5 engines being use_ on S-/V;
_o_ only is the arrangement of six engines on this vehic_e bad, but
_hese e....__=s have very poor s_arting characteristics, q_-.._e400_000-
C-3 would char:_e frc_ a messy 12-engined vehicle requiring lO in-flight
engine starts to a fairly simple 5-engine vehicle -_th only 3 in-flight
engine s_a__Ls.
__r_-addition, the foilo'._nc_ en=ines_ should be included in a __rogram:
1,000,000 - 1,500,000 lb. Solid
5,000,000 Solid
_d/or 5,000,000 Storable
_._= !_.,O00 - 1,5uO, OuO lb. solid _ould in itself be a good building
block s_d _ou!d probably work in nicely to extend the csuabilities of
vehicles, such as Titan. The 5,000,000 solid am.d/or s_orable would also
be good building blocks amd specifically would serve as alternate first-
staa_ bcosters for C-3, aiming at simplicity and reliability.
• . %
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It may be said that there is nothing new here and that all of the
above is obvious. Indeed, it seems so obvious that one wonders why such
a progr_ _'as not st_-_ted 5 years ago. But the fact that it may be
obvious doesn't help us; what is necessary is putting the obvious into
effect. In this connection, there may be some who ask_-"But are the
ply_us optS_m-am a_ud the best?". This question is really not pertinent.
There will never be an optimized booster or program. We might have an
optlm'_m booster for a given situation, but there is none that is cptLmum
for _ll situations. To @_eek one, would Just cause _ellberatlon _o s_rSng
out Indefinl%ely with 11%tie, if _ny, prog_'_ss being made. _'he D_a-
So__r case is a good example of this.
A criticism that u_.doubtedly will be leveled at the above suggestions
is that I'm no% being realistic in that there is Just not enough money
aro'_ud to do all these things. If this is the situation, then the ans,_-er
is simply that's why _:e have Vebb _nd his staff. That's why he was
chosen to head the orga_ulzation, this is one of his major __uctions,
to ask the question, do we want to do a job or not?, s_nd, if so, then
_o find out _'here the gaps or holes are, and then to go about doing _<_at
is necessary tc fill the gaps to make sure the job gets done, _ther,
the load doesn't have to be carried by the I;ASA alone. The Air Force _.d
I_%SA c_n_o'.-k together and share the _load? and I'm sure that if this is
_one, the necessary money can be found. Even if some _roject, say, for
example, the 5,000,O00-1b. storable engine has to be dropped for some
reason after it gets star_ed; no harm %_!i be done. This happens every
day. On the contra_ry, some good_ some new knowledge, will have been
uncovered, even if it turns ou_ to be the discovery of the nex_ obstacl =.
•Thich prevents such a booster from being built.
lTuclear booster _d booster size.- Although not 'mentioned in the
previous section, _,,ork on nuclear engines should, of course, continue.
Any pro._-ess maie here _ll integrate very nicely into the booster plans
in_iaated in the attacD_nent.
As regar&s booster size, the follo_H_ng comment is offered. Exchding
for the moment I_OVA type vehicles, we should strive for boosters %'hich
make use of the engines mentioned in the preceding section and which
are the biggest that can be made and yet still be commensurate with
existing test-stem.d sites __nd with the use of launch sites that are
cc____osed of an array of assembly buildings _nd multiple l_'_nch pads.
The idea behind la'_nch sites of this tyge is an excellent one. It keeps
real estate de.__nds to a minimum, allows for ease in vehicle assembly
and check-out, end greatly eases the launch rate problem. Thus, C-3 or
f" lC-4, snou_d be designed accordingly. We would then have a nice work-horse
type vehicle having relative ease of h_nd!ing, and which would permit a
lunar landing Lission, as indicated earlier in the lunar rendezvous
,._rite-up section. From my point of view, I would much rather confine
my spending to a single versatile launch site of the type mentionedj save
money in real estate acquisition and launch site development necessary for
the huge vehicles_ and put the money saved into an engine development-
program.
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Concluding Ram--_-rks
It is one thing to gripe, another to offer constructive criticism.
Thus, in making a few final remarks i would like to offer what I feel
would be a so'_ud integrated overall program. I think we should:
1. Get a rearmed rendezvous e_.Yperiment going with the
!.'_rk II Mercury.
2 Firm up the engine program s._esved in this letter
_nd attachment; conve_ing the booster to these engines as
soon as possible.
3. Establish the concept of using a C-3 and lunar rendez-
vous to acccmp!ish the manned i-_nar l_nding as a firm program.
Naturally, in discussing matters of the type touched upon herein,
one c__r_no_ make co_ents _ithout h_ving them smack somewhat against
NOVA. I _-_t to assure you, however, I'm not tr_ing to say NOVA should
not be built, i'm sL_p!y trying to establish that our scheme deserves
a parallel front-llne position. As a matter of fact, because the lunar
rendezvous __Dproach is easier, quick_r, less costly, requires less
___=_: ..... , s sites aria facilities, it would appear more
aoorooriate to say that this is the way to go, and that we %_!i use
[[O\q_as a fol!o_ on. Give us the go-ahead, and a C-3, and we __iI put
men% on the moon in very short order - and we don't need _ny Eouston
empire to do it.
In closing, Dr. Sea_io--ns,let me say that should you desire to dis-
cuss the points covers6 in _his !etts_ in more detail, I _ou!d welcome
the o}port_nity to come up to Eeadquar_ers to discuss thenn with you.
Respectfully yours,
JCH._om
Job_u C. Iioubolt
°-.
Enc!s.
CONCLUDING REMARKS BY DR. WERNHER VON BRAUN
ABOUT MODE SELECTION FOR THE _.UNAR LANDING PROGRAM
GIVEN TO DR. JOSEPH F. SHEA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SYSTEMS)
OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
JUNE 7, 196Z
In the previous- six hours we presented to you the results of some
of the many studies we at Marshall have prepared in connection with
the MarmOt Lunar Landing Project. The purpose of all the's'e studies
was to identify potential technical problem areas, and to make sound
and realistic scheduling estimates. All studies were aimed atassisting
you xA your final recommendation with respect'to the mode to be chosen
for the Manned Lunar Landing Project.
Our general conclusion is that all four modes investigated are
technically feasible and could be implemented with enough time and
money. We have, however, arrived at a definite list of preferences
in the following order:
, Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode - with the strong
recommendation (to make up for the limited
growth potential of this mode) to initiate, simul-
taneously, the development of an unmanned, fully
automatic, one-way C-5 logistics vehicle.
Z. Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode (Tanking Mode).
3. C-5 Direct Mode with minimum size Command
Module and High Energy Return.
4. Nova or C-8 Mode.
I shall give you the reasons behind this conclusion in just one minutd
But first lwould like to reiterate once more that it is absolutely
mandatory that we arrive at a definite 1_ode decision within the next few
weeks, preferably by the first of July, 1962. We are already losing tim
in our over-all program as a result of a lacking mode decision.
I I
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A typical exan_pie is the S-IVB contract. If the S-IVB stage is to
serve not only as the third (escape) stage for the C-5, but also as the
second stage for the C-IB needed in support of rendezvous tests, a
flyable S-IVB will be needed at least one year earlier than if there was
no C-IB at all. The impact of this question on facility planning, build-
up of contractor level of effort, etc., should be obvious.
Furthermore, if we do not freeze the mode now, we cannot lay out
a definite program with a schedule on which the budgets for FY-1964 and
following can be based. Finally, if we do not make a clear-cut decision
on the mode very soon, our chances of accomplishing the first lunar ex-
pedition in this decade will fade av.ay rapidly.
WHY DO WE RECOMMEND LUNAR ORBIT RENDEZVOUS MODE PLUS
C- 5" ONE -WAY LOGISTICS VEHICLE ?
a. We believe this program offers the highest confidence factor
of successful accomplishment within this decade.
b. It offers an adequate performance margin. With storable
propellants, both for the Service Module and Lunar Excursion Module,
we should have a comfortable padding with respect to propulsion per-
formance and weights. The performance margin could be further in-
creased by initiation of a back-up development aimed at a High Energy
Propulsion System for the Service Module and possibly the Lunar
Excursion Module. Additional performance gains could be obtained
if current proposals by Rocketdyne to increase the thrust and/or
specific impulses of the F-1 and J-2 engines were implemented.
c. We agree with the Manned Spacecraft Center that the
designs of a maneuverable hyperbolic re-entry vehicle and of a lunar .,
landing vehicle constitute the two most critical tasks in producing a
successful lunar spacecraft. A drastic separation of these two functions
into two separate elements is bound to greatly simplify the development
of the spacecraft system. Developmental cross-feed between results
from simulated or actual landing tests, on the one hand, and re-entry
tests, on the other, are minimized if no attempt is made to include the "
Command Module into the lunar landing process. The mechanical sepa-
ration of the two functions would virtually permit completely parallel
developments of the Command Module and the Lunar Excursion Module.
While it may be difficult to accurately appraise this advantage in terms
of months to be gained, we have no doubt whatsoever that such a procedure
will indeed result in very substantial saving of time. ., '
i
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d. We believe that the combination of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous
Mode and a C-5 one-way Logistics Vehicle offers a great growth potential.
After the first successful landing on the moon, demands for follow-on
programs will essentially center on increased lunar surface mobility and
increased material supplies for shelter, food, oxygen, scientific instru-
mentation, etc. It appears that the Lunar Excursion Module, when refilled
with propellants brought down by the Logistics Vehicle, constitutes an ideal
means for lunar surface transportation. First estimates indicate that in
the i/6 G gravitational field of the moon, the Lunar Excursion Module,
when used as a lunar taxi, would have a radius of action of at least 40 miles
from around the landing point of the Logistics Vehicle. It may well be that
on the rocky and treacherous lunar terrain the Lunar Excursion Module will
turn out to be a far more attractive type of a taxi than a wheeled or cater-
pillar vehicle.
i
e. We believe the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode using a single
C-5 offers a very good chance of ultimately _rowin_ into a C-5 direct
capability. At this time we recommend against relying on the C-_L-5-qDq-Fect
"--lQI_6_-5-e_ause of its need for a much lighter command module as well as
a high energy landing and return propulsion system. While it may be
unwise to count on the availability of such advanced equipment during this
decade (this is why this mode was given a number 3 rating) it appears
entirely within reach in the long haul.
f. If and when at some later time a reliable nuclear third stage
for Saturn C-5 emerges from the RIFT program, the performance margin
for the C-5 Direct Mode will become quite"ffo'_fortable.
I
g. Conversely, if the Advanced Saturn C-5 were dropped in
favor of a Nova or C-8, it would completely upset all present plans for
the implementation of the RIFT program. Contracts, both for the engines,
and the_ RIFT stage, have already been let and would probably have to be
cancelled until a new program could be developed.
h. We conclude from our studies that an automatic pinpoint
letdown on the lunar surface going through a circumlunar orbit and using
a landing beacon is entirely possible. Whether this method should be "
limited to the C-5 Logistics Vehicle or be adopted as a secondary mode
for the Lunar Excursion Module is a matter that should be carefully dis-
cussed with the Manned Spacecraft Center. it may well be that the demand
for incorporation of an additional automatic landing capability in the Lunar
Excursion Module buys more trouble than gains.
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i. The Lunar Orbit I_endezvous Mode augmented by a C-5
Logistics Vehicle undoubtedly offers the cleanest managerial interfaces
between the Manned Spacecraft Center, iVlarshall Space Flight Center,
Launch Operations Center and all our contractors. While the precise
effect of this may be hard to appraise, it is a commonly accepted fact
that the number and the nature of technical and managerial interfaces
are very major factors in conducting a complex program on a tight
time schedule. There are already.aa frightening number of interfaces
in existence in our Manned Lunar Landing Program.--_aere are inter-
faces between the stages of the launch vehicles, between launch vehicles
and spacecraft, between complete space vehicles and their ground equip-
ment, between manned and automatic checkout, and in the managerial
area between the Centers, the Washington Program Office, and the
contractors. The plain result of too many interfaces is a continuous
and'disastrous erosion of the authority vested in the line organization
and the need for more coordination meetings, integration groups, work-
ing panels, ad-hoc committees, etc. Every effort should therefore be
made to reduce the number of technical and managerial interfaces to a
bare minimum.
j. Compared with the C-5 Direct Mode or the Nova/C-8 Mode,
the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode offers the advantage that no existing
contracts for stages (if we go to Nova) or spacecraft systems (if we go
to C-5 Direct) have to be terminated; that the contractor structure in
existence can be retained; that the contract negotiations presently going
on can be finished under the existing set of ground rules; that the con-
tractor build-up program (already in full swing) can be continued as
planned; that facilities already authorized and under c:onstruction can
be built as planned, etc.
k. We at the Marshall Space Flight Center readily admit that
when first exposed to the proposaI of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode
we were a bit skeptical - particuiarly of the aspect of having the astronauts
execute a complicated rendezvous maneuver at a distance of 240,000 miles
from the earth where any rescue possibility appeared remote. In the
meantime, however, we have spent a great deai of time and effort studying
the four modes, and we have come to the conclusion that this particular
disadvantage is far outweighed by the advantages listed above.
We understand that the Manned Spacecraft Center was also
quite skeptical at first when John Houbolt of Langley advanced the proposal
of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode, and that it took them quite a while to
substantiate the feasibili@ of the method and finally endorse it.
AgainsL ;his background it can, therefore, be concludcd that
the issue of "invented here" versus "not invented here" does not apply to
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either the Manned Spacecraft Center or the Marshall Space Flight Center;
that both Centers have actually embraced a scheme suggested by a third
sou_qp.ja_. Undoubtedly, personnel of MSC and MSFC have by now conducted
more detailed studies on all aspects of the four modes than any other group.
Moreover, it is these two Centers to which the Office of Manned Space Flight
would ultimately have to look to "deliver the goods". I consider it fortunate
indeed for the Manned Lunar Landing Program that both Centers, after much
soul searching, have come to identical conclusions. This should give the
Office of Manned Space Flight some additional assurance that our recom-
mendations should not be too far from the truth.
II. WHY DO WE NOT RECOMMEND THE EARTH ORBIT RENDEZVOUS MODE?
Let me point out again that we at the Marshall Space Fligbt Center con-
sider the Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode entirely feasible. Specifically, we
found the Tanking Mode substantially superior to the Connecting Mode. Com-
pared to the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode, it even seems to offer--a somewhat
greater performance margin. This is true even if only the nominal two C-5's
(tanker and manned lunar vehicle) are involved, but the per--Fforrnance nlargin
could be further enlarged almost indefinitely by the use of additional tankers.
¥$e have spent more time and effort here at Marshall on studies of the
Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode (Tanking and Connecting Modes) than on any
other mode. This is attested to by six big volumes describing all aspects
of this mode. Nor do we think that in the light of our final recommendation -
to adopt the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode instead - this effort was in vain.
Earth Orbit Rendezvous as a general operational procedure will undoubtedly
play a major role in our over-all national space flight program, and the use
of it is even mandatory in developing a Lunar Orbit Rendezvous capability.
The reasons why, in spite of these advantages, we moved it down to
position number Z on our totem pole are as follows:
a. We consider the Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode more complex
and costlier than Lunar Orbit Rendezvous. Moreover, lunar mission success
with Earth Orbit Rendezvous requires two consecutive successful launches.
If, for example, after a successful tanker launch, the manned lunar vehicle
aborts during its ascent, or fails to get off the pad within a certain permis-
sible period of time, the first (tanker) flight must also be written off as
useless for the mission.
b. The interface problems arising between the Manned Spacecraft
Center and the Marshall Space Flight Center, both in the technical and
management areas, would be more difficult if the Earth Orbit Rendezvous
Mode was adopted. For example, if"_he tanker as an unmam,ed vehicle
was handled by MSFC, and the flight of the manned lunar vehicle was
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conducted by the Manned Spacecraft Center, a managerial interface
arises between target and chaser. On the other hand, if any one of
the two Centers would take over the entire mission, it would probably
bite off more than it could chew, with the result of even more difficult
and unpleasant interface problems.
c. According to repeated statements _y_ Bob Gilru_ the Apollo
Command Module in its presently envisioned form is simply unsuited for
lunar landing because of the poor visibility conditions and the undesirable
supine position of the astronauts during landing.
III. WHY DO WE NOT RECOMMEND THE C-5 DIRECT MODE?
It is our conviction that the C-5 Direct Mode will ultimately become
feasible - once we know more about hyperbolic re-entry, and once we
have adequate high energy propulsion systems available that can be used
conveniently and reliably on the surface of the moon. With the advent of
a nuclear third stage for C-5, the margin for this capability will be sub-
stantially widened, of course.
a. Our main reason against recommending the C-5 Direct Mode
is its marginal weight allowance for the spacecraft and the demand for
high energy return propulsion, combined with the time factor, all of
which would impose a very substantial additional burden on the Manned
Spacecraft Center.
b. The Manned Spacecraft Center has spent a great deal of time
and effort in determining realistic spacecraft weights. In the opinion of
Bob Gilruth and Chuck Mathews, it would simply not be realistic to expect
that a lunar spacecraft light enough to be used with the C-5 Direct Mode
could be developed during this decade with an adequate degree of confidence.
c. The demand for a high energy return propulsion system, which
is implicit in the C-5 Direct Mode, is considered undesirable by the Manned
Spacecraft Center - at the present state-of-the-art at least - because this
propulsion system must also double up as an extra-atmospheric abort
propulsion system. For this purpose, MSC considers a propulsion system
as simple and reliable as possible (storable and hypergolic propellants) as
absolutely mandatory. We think the question of inherent reliability of
storable versus high energy propulsion systems - and their usability in
the lunar surface environment - can be argued, but as long as the require-
ment for "storables" stands, the C-5 Direct Mode is not feasible performance-
wise ',
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d. NASA has already been saddled with one program (Centaur)
where the margin between performance claims for launch vehicle and
demands for payload weights were drawn too closely. We do not consider
it prudent to repeat this mistake.
IV. WHY DO WE RECOMMEND AGAINST THE NOVA OR C-8 MODE ?
It should be clearly understood that our recommendation against the
- Nova orC-8 Mode at this time refers solely to its use as a launch vehicle
for the implementation of the President's commitment to put a man on the
moon in this decade. We at Mars_h_11 f_el very strongly that the Advanced_
Saturn C-5 is not the end of the line as far as major .launch vehicles are
"Cconcerncd! Undoubtedly, as we shall be going about setting up-a base on
_he moon and beginning with the manned expl0r.ation of the planets, there
wili be a great need for launch vehicles more _owerful than the C-5. But
for these purposes such a new vehicle could be conceived and developed
on a more relaxed time schedule. It would be a true follow-on launch
vehicle. All of our studies aimed at NASA's needs for a true manned
interplanetary capability indicate that a launch vehicle substantially
more powerful than one powered by eight F-1 engines would be required.
Our recommendation, therefore, should be formulated as follows: "Let us
take Nova or C-8 out of the race of putting an American on the moon in this
decade; but let us develop a sound concept for a follow-on 'Supernova' launch
vehicle".
Here are our reasons for recommending to take Nova or C-8 out of the
present Manned Lunar Landing Program:
a. As previously stated, the Apollo system in its present form is
not landable on the moon. The spacecraft system would require substantial
changes from the presently conceived configuration. The same argument is,
of course, applicable to the Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode.
b. With the S-II stage of the Advanced Saturn C-5 serving as a
second stage of a C-8 (boosted by eight F-1 engines} we would have an un-
desirable, poorly staged, hybrid launch vehicle, with a payload capability
far below the maximum obtainable with the same first stage. Performance-
wise, with its escape capability of only 13Z, 000 lbs. (in lieu of the 150,000
lbs. demanded) it would still be too marginal, without a high energy return
propulsion system, to land the present Apollo Command Module on the surface
of the moon.
'c. Im_iementation of the Nova or C-8 program Lu addition to
the Advanced Saturn C-5 would lead to two grossly underfunded and under-
managed programs with resulting abject failure of both. Implemcntation
!
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of the Nova or C-8 program in lieu of the Advanced Saturn C-5 would have
an absolutely disastrous impact on all our facility plans.
The rafter height of the Michoud plant is 40 feet. The diameter
of the S-IC iz 33 feet. As a result, most of the assembly operations for the
S-IC booster of the C-5 can take place in a horizontal position. Only a rela-
tively narrow high bay tower must be added to the main building for a few
operations which must be carried out in a vertical position. A Nova or C-8
booster, however, has a diameter of approximately 50 feet. This means
that the roof of a very substantial portion of the Michoud plant would have
to be raised by 15 to Z0 feet. Another alternative would be to build a very
large high bay area where every operation involving, cun_bersome parts
would be done in a vertical position. In either case the very serious question
arises whether under these circumstances the Michoud plant was a good
sel'ection to begin with.
The foundation situation at Michoud is so poor that extensive
pile driving is necessary. This did not bother us when we acquired the
plant because the many thousands of piles on which it rests were driven
twenty years ago by somebody else. But if we had to enter into a major
pile driving operation now, the question would immediately arise as to
whether we could.not find other building sites where foundations could be
prepared cheaper and faster.
Any tampering with the NASA commitment to utilize the Michoud
plant, howe_,er, would also affect Chrysler's S-I program, for which tooling
and plant preparation are already in full swing at Micho_id. Raising the roof
• and driving thousands of piles in Michoud may turn out to be impossible while
Chrysler is assembling S-I's in the same hangar.
In summary, the impact of a switch from C-5 to Nova/C-8 on
the very concept of Michoud, would call for a careful and detailed study
whose outcome with respect to continued desirability of the use of the
Michoud plant appears quite doubtful. We consider it most likely that
discontinuance of the C-5 plan in favor of Nova or 0-8 would reopen the
entire Michoud decision and would.throw the entire program into turmoil
with ensuing unpredictable delays. The construction of a new plant would
take at least Z-I/Z years to beneficial occupancy and over 3 years to start
of production.
d. At the Marshall Space Flight Center, construction of a static
test stand for S-IC booster is well under way. In its present form this test
stand cannot bc used for the first stage of Nova on C-8. Studies indicate
that as far as the noise level is concerned, there will probably be no ob-
jection to firin-_ up eight F-I engines at MSFC. However, the Marshall
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test stand construction program would be greatly delayed, regardless of
what approach we would take to accommodate Nova/C-8 stages. Detailed
studies seem to indicate that the fastest course of action, if Nova or C-8
were adopted, would be to build
- a brand new eight F-I booster test stand south
of the present S-IC test stand, and
convert the present S-IC test stand into an N-II
test stand. (This latter conclusion is arrived at
because the firing of an N-II stage at Santa Susanna
is not possible for safety reasons, the S-II propel-
lant load being considered the absolute maximum
permissible. )
The Mississippi Test Facility is still a "cow pasture that
NASA doesn't even own yet", and cannot compete with any test stand avail-
ability dates in Huntsville. Developments of basic utilities (roads, water,
power, sewage, canals, rail spur, etc.) at MTF will require well over a
year, and all scheduling studies indicate that whatever we build at MTF is
about 18 months behind comparable facilities b tliltin Huntsville. MTF
should, therefore, be considered an acceptance firing and product improve-
ment site for Michoud products rather thah a besic development site.
e. :In view of. the fact that the S-II stage is not powerful enough
for the Apollo direct flight mission profile, a'second stage powered by
eight or nine J-Z's or two M-l's is needed. Such a stage would again be
L
on the order of 40 to 50 feet in diameter. No'studies have been made as
to whether it could be built in the Downey/Seal Beach complex. It is certain,
however, that its static testing in Santa Susanna is impossible. As a result,
vce would have to take an entirely new look at the NAA contract.
f. I have already mentioned the disruptive effect a cancellation of
the C-5 would have on the RIFT program.
g. One of the strongest arguments against replacement of the
Advanced Saturn C-5 by Nova or C-8 is that such a decision would topple
our entire contractor structure. It should be remembered that the tem-
porary uncertainty about the r'elatively minor question of whether NA.A
should assemble at Seal Beach or Eglin cost us a delay of almost half a
year, I think it should not take much imagination to realize what would
happen if we were to tell Boeing, NAA and Douglas that the C-5 was out;
that we are going to. build a booster with eight F-1 engines, a second.
stage with eight or nine J-Z's or maybe two M-1 engines; and that the
entire problem of manufacturing and testing facilities must be re-evaluated.
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We already have several thousands of men actually at work on these three
stages and many of them have been dislocated from their home plants in
implementation of our present C-5 program. Rather than leaving these
thousands of men suspended (although supported by NASA dollars) in a
state of uncertainty over an extended period of new systems analysis,
prograln implementation studies, budget reshuffles, site selection pro-
cedures, etc., it may indeed turn out to be wiser to just terminate the
existing contracts and advise the contractors that we will call them back
once we }lave a new program plan laid out for them. We have no doubt
that the termination costs incurring to NASA by doing this would easily
amount to several hundred million dollars.
I have asked a selected group" of key Marshall executives
for their appraisal, in terms of delay of the first orbital launch, if the
C-5 was to be discontinued and replaced by a Nova or C-8. The estimates
of these men (whose duties it would be to implement, the new program)
varied between 14 and Z4 months with an average estimate of an over-all
delay of 19 months.
h. In appraising the total loss to NASA, it should also not be
overlooked that we are supporting engine development teams at various
contractor plants at the rate of many tens of millions of dollars per year
for every stage of C-I and C-5. If the exact definition of the stages were
delayed by switching to Nova/C-8, these engine development teams would
have to be held on the .NASA payroll for just that much longer, in order to
assure proper engine/stage integration.
i. More than twelve months of past extensive effort at the Marshall
Space Flight Center to analyze and define the Advanced Saturn C-5 system in
a great deal of engineering detail would have to be written off as a flat loss,
if we abandoned the G-5 now. This item alone, aside from the time irre-
trievably lost, represents an expenditure of over o_e hundred million dollars.
j. The unavoidable uncertainty in many areas created by a switch
to Nova or C-8 (Can we retain present C-5 contractors? V_here are the new
fabrication sites? Where are we going to static test? etc.) may easily lead
to delays even well in excess of the estimates given above. For in view of
the polltical pressures invariab!_ exerted on NASA in connection with facility
siting decisions, it is quite likely that even the NASA Administrator himself
will find himself frequently unable to make binding decisions without demanding
from OMSF an extensive re-appraisal of a multitude of issues related with
siting. There was ample evidence of this during the past year.
e
k. For all the reasons quoted above, the Marshall Space Flight Center
considers a discontinuation of the Advanced S_.Lurn C-5 in favor of Nova or C-8
as the worst of the four proposed n_odes for implementation of the inanned lunar
landing project. ¥[e at Marshall would consider a decision in favor of this mode
to be tant a:_ou,_t wit]_ _ivi::L' u12 the tact: to put a man on the r_oon in this (_ecade
IN SUlvlMARY I THEREFORE RECOMMi'_ND THAT:
a. The Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode be adopted.
b. A development of an unmanned, fully automatic,
one-way C-5 Logistics Vehicle be undertaken in
support of the lunar expedition.
C, The C-I program as established today be retained
and that, in accordance with progress_rnade in S-IVB
development, the C-I be gradually replaced by the
C-IB.
do
eo
A C-IB program be officially established and approved
with adequate funding.
The development of high energy propulsion systems
be initiated as a back-up for the Service Module and
possibly the Lunar Excursion Module.
f4 Supplements to present development contracts to
Rocketdyne on the F-I and J-Z engines be let to
increase thrust and/or specific impulse.
Wernher von Braun, Director
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
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Date
Sept. 1959
Dec. 1959
Feb. 1960
Apr. 1960
Spring 1960
Spring 1960
lday 1960
Sept. 1960
Nov. 1960
Dec. 1960
Dec. 1960
Jan. 1961
Jan. 1961
Jan. 1961
Jan. 1961
Apr. 1961
May 1961
Jun. 1961
Jun. 1961
The Road to the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Decision:
Presentations by John C. Houbolt
Location
Langley Research Center
Langley Research Center
Langley Research Center
New York City
Langley Research Center
Langley Research Center
Langley Research Center
Langley Research Center
The Pentagon
Langley Research Center
NASA Headquarters
NASA Headquarters
Langley Research Center
Langley Research Center
NASA Headquarters
Langley Research Center
NASA Headquarters
France
Committee/Audience
Manned Space Laboratory Group
Goett Committee
Manned Space Laboratory Group
Society of Automotive Engineers
Robert Piland and Space Task
Group Members
William Mmz_k
htercenter Review
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Air Force Scientific Advisory
Board
Space Task Group Leaders
Headquarters Staff (Glennan, yon
Braun, Seamans, and Faget)
Space Exploration Program Council
Space Task Group Members
Low Committee Representative
NASA Headquarters Staff
Space Task Group
First Letter to Seamans
Lundin Committee
International Space Flight
Symposium
Jul. 1961
Jul. 1961
Aug. 1961
Aug. 1961
Nov. 1961
Jan. 1962
Jan. 1962
Feb. 1962
Apr. 1962
Jun. 1962
Langley Research Center
Washington, DC
NASA Headquarters
Langley Research Center
Langley Research Center
Houston, TX
NASA Headquarters
Marshall Space Flight Center
Rehearsal with Space Task Group
NASA/Industry Apollo Technical
Conference
Golovin Committee
Space Task Group
Second Letter to Seamans
Joseph Shea and Space Task Group
Manned Spacecraft Center
Personnel
Manned Space Fright Management
Council
Report and papers sent to Wernher
von Braun
Lunar Mode Decision Conference
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